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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis seeks to interrogate the response of the European Union to the events known as the Arab 
uprisings, with a particular focus on the political transitions experienced by Egypt and Tunisia since 
early 2011. It conducts a thorough textual analysis of major European Neighbourhood Policy 
documents and ‘speech acts’ related to Egypt and Tunisia, using Norman Fairclough’s three-
dimensional Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). In each instance of ENP discourse, this study sees a 
text, a discursive practice and a social practice. It identifies the particular discursive configurations of 
democracy promotion in these text samples, noting a significant change in tone since the launch of the 
ENP in 2003. More specifically, it points to the new neighbourhood agenda developed by the EU 
since the wave of protests in the Middle-East and North Africa, characterised by greater ownership of 
ENP policies by EU partners, considerable differentiation in their objectives and a heightened concern 
for the stabilisation of the region. Rooted in a critical, constructivist approach to discourse analysis, it 
eventually contends that the seemingly less voluntarist narrative developed in South Neighbourhood 
policy documents is the result of higher threat perception in the Union. A threat narrative is indeed 
highlighted, as a particular instance of a crisis rhetoric, resulting in a notable downscaling of EU 
normative ambitions in the region. Investigation of the Egyptian and Tunisian cases since 2011 
provides important information regarding these developments in the ENP. This thesis eventually 
points to civil society assistance as a narrative of inclusiveness which could prove to be a significant 
addition to ENP democracy promotion agenda, while recognising the limits of this endeavour. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1. The European Neighbourhood Policy in context 
 
Under the Treaty on European Union that arose from the 2008 restructuring of the legal 
framework of the EU, the management of EU external policies went through a rather significant 
change that altered the nature and spirit of the Union’s competence in this domain. Indeed, Article 8 
states that it is the Union’s endowment to “develop a special relationship with neighbouring 
countries.”1 As such, the legal basis for the neighbourhood policy is included in the Common 
Provisions of the TEU, not in Title V TEU and Part V Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, related to external competences, nor in the final provisions (Art. 49 TEU) linked to 
enlargement policy. Additionally, an explicit reference is made to the “values of the Union”; the 
European character of the norms meant to be promoted, among which democratic governance and 
respect for human rights are paramount, is thus emphasised. This development represents a shift away 
from previous formulas that usually rested on the idea of shared or common values. This competence, 
as well as the self-assertion of a certain core of values as constitutive of the identity of the Union 
itself, echoes the role of its external action toward its neighbourhood, and more particularly across the 
Mediterranean, as a particular arena for the affirmation of EU normative power.  
 
Thus far, the partnership has revolved around overlapping frameworks, among which the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, initiated in 2004, appears prominent. Its intrinsically composite nature, 
combining “overarching foreign policy goals with functional, sectoral cooperation across the 
spectrum of the EU’s acquis communautaire”, constitutes a broad framework for cooperation.2 Its 
comprehensive character is however not fully explored throughout the following discussion. It focuses 
predominantly on political and security dialogue, the first of the three baskets established within the 
ENP structure. It may however refer to economic and financial cooperation or social, cultural and 
human exchange where relevant. 
 
The ENP framework encompasses sixteen recipient countries, located both in the Eastern and 
Southern neighbourhood, hence academic discussions of the ENP as a whole can be rather non-
specific. For the sake of clarity, this paper seeks to consider two partner states only, Egypt and 
Tunisia. By virtue of their particular historical ties with former European colonial powers, as well as 
the political transition both countries experienced as an outcome of political turmoil in 2011, they 
constitute an interesting object of study in order to understand the successes and failures of the EU’s 
foreign policy toward its Southern neighbourhood. Moreover, in spite of their numerous differences, 
they seem to constitute adequate case-studies in order to evaluate the efforts of the Union to promote 
democratic transitions in the region. This supposedly normative character of the Union’s external 
action in its vicinity gave rise to a great deal of debate and assumptions regarding the type of power 
exerted by the European union, including the notion of Normative Power Europe developed by Ian 
Manners in the early 2000s.3 It insists on the export of certain core values embedded in a liberal 
                                                                                                      
1 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 8, 2008 O.J., C 115/20. 
2  Freyburg, T., Lavenex, S., Schimmelfennig, F., Skripka, T. and Wetzel, A. (2011) ‘Democracy promotion 
through functional cooperation? The case of the European neighbourhood policy’, Democratization, 18(4), 
p.1027. 
3 Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms?’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 40(2), pp.235–258. 
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democratic governance, but the apparent lack of success of the EU in triggering democratic change in 
its neighbourhood led to growing disaffection for the concept.  
 
Anyhow, scholarly attention to democracy support in EU neighbourhood emphasised some of its 
distinctive traits. It highlighted its pluralistic approach, the complexity of its mechanisms, the diversity 
of its instruments as well as the flexibility of its objectives.4 Conversely, it pointed to the fuzziness of 
its understanding of democracy, unclear normative grounds to justify its democracy promotion 
abroad, certain contradictions in the formulation of the policies associated with it, and finally the 
relative de-politisation - bureaucratisation - of democracy assistance.5 Thorough attention to the 
discursive mechanisms at play in ENP policy documents evidences most of those elements. However, 
this paper opposes the idea of a de-politicisation of democracy promotion in the context of European 
foreign policy-making. More particularly, it identifies a dialectical relationship between normative 
goals and security interests and argues that changes in the EU neighbourhood in the aftermath of the 
Arab uprisings re-vitalised and re-politicised security issues, with certain consequences for EU 
democracy promotion in the region. 
 
1.2. The Arab uprisings: A challenge for the ENP 
 
The following discussion thus attempts to analyse the response of the EU to the 2011 
uprisings in the Middle-East and North Africa, events commonly known as the ‘Arab Spring.’ The 
term Arab Spring itself, though rather popular in the few months following popular unrest in the 
region, has since then been the target of increasing criticism. The failure of the protests to achieve 
political transition in Bahrain and Algeria, the breakout of civil war in Yemen, Syria and Libya as 
well as the limited success of the front-runners Egypt and Tunisia in consolidating democratisation 
prompted a critique of the use of spring to qualify the events. “Relatively optimistic” media 
comments from the West which embraced “metaphors like ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Democratic Tsunami’” 
were quickly superseded by a narrative focused on security concerns, partly motivated by the 
degradation of the situation in Libya and Syria.6 Hence this paper gives preference to the term Arab 
uprisings, which do not present any form of judgment nor anticipation with regard to the events 
themselves. While both Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia’s autocratic ruler Zine al-
Abidine Ben Ali were ousted under the pressure of unprecedented social upheaval, the uprisings 
challenged considerably the Union’s policies in the region. Indeed, commentators pointed to its 
external action often characterised by the so-called “democratisation-stability dilemma”, and the 
prevalence of stabilisation policies over calls for democratic transition.7 The instability faced by 
Southern Mediterranean countries -Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria above all- revived the relevance 
of this dichotomous interpretation.  
 
As a result, the Arab uprisings constituted a substantial challenge for EU democracy promotion in the 
MENA region. This specific external policy is indeed present in all ENP documents and publications, 
and constitutes a pillar of EU involvement in its neighbourhood. One answer to that normative 
ambition in the exercise of its external power is to be found in the 2003 European Security Strategy, 
                                                                                                      
4 Kurki, M. (2012). How the EU can adopt a new type of democracy support. [online] Madrid: Fundación para 
las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), p.3.  
5 Ibid., p.4. 
6 Seeberg, P. and Shteiwi, M. (2014). European Narratives on the ‘Arab Spring’ – from Democracy to Security. 
[online] Odense: Center for ￼Mellemøststudier, p.1.  
7 Behr, T. (2012). The European Union's Mediterranean policies after the Arab spring: Can the Leopard change 
its spots?. Amsterdam Law Forum, [online] 4(2), pp.76-88. 
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where it is stated that “the quality of international society depends on the quality of governments that 
are at its foundation. The best protection for [EU] security is a world of well-governed democratic 
states.”8 The European Union thus identifies democracy as a prerequisite for a secure international 
milieu. It has nevertheless shown little response to the Arab uprisings. Scholars have indeed qualified 
its answer to the 2011 events as “strikingly slow,”9 “divided and incoherent,”10 lacking “democratic 
substance”11 and its democracy promotion policy in such context as mere “spectatorship.”12 
 
Moreover, although the protests in Arab states aimed at the ousting of authoritarian regimes, it has 
now been established that the European Union perceived them primarily through the lens of its 
security interests.13 In the context of unprecedented social upheaval at its doorstep, the EU was once 
more forced to cope with a dilemma: support the protests in the name of democratic governance or 
secure the stability of authoritarian regimes, many of whom with substantial “strategic and 
geopolitical significance”, particularly for their role in counter-terrorism policies, in the fight against 
illegal migration and the key position of Northern African countries for EU energy routes.14 In the 
light of this dilemma, characteristic of the Union’s foreign policy in the Mediterranean, it can be 
argued that security concerns have and will continually to shape the EU’s democracy promotion 
politics in the MENA region.15  
 
As a result, this paper seeks to further interrogate the relationship between the EU’s normative 
ambitions and security concerns with its Southern Mediterranean partners, instantiated in the 
democratisation-stability dilemma. This objective however requires an appropriate definition of key 
concepts, additional theoretical considerations as well as a methodological framework, all presented 
in the following sections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                      
8 European External Action Service, (2003). A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. 
[online] Brussels. 
9 Echagüe, A., Michou, H. and Mikail, B. (2011). Europe and the Arab Uprisings: EU Vision versus Member 
State Action. Mediterranean Politics, [online] 16(2), p.329. 
10 Koenig, N. (2011). The EU and the Libyan crisis – in quest of coherence?. The International Spectator, 
[online] 46(4), pp.12-13. 
11 Bossuyt, F., Orbie, J. and Wetzel, A. (2015). One of what kind? Comparative perspectives on the substance of 
EU democracy promotion. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 28(1), pp.21-34. 
12 Schumacher, T. (2011). The EU and the Arab spring: Between Spectatorship and Actorness. Insight Turkey, 
[online] 13(3), pp.107-119.  
13 Del Sarto, R. (2015). Normative empire Europe: The European Union, its borderlands, and the 'Arab spring'. 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 54(2), p.225. 
14 Khalifa Isaac, S. (2013). Rethinking the new ENP: A vision for an enhanced European role in the Arab 
revolutions. Democracy and Security, 9(1-2), p.41. 
15 Pace, M. (2007). Norm shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a norm entrepreneur in the south?. Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, [online] 20(4), pp.659-675. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical framework 
 
 
 
2.1.  The Mediterranean in EU foreign policy 
 
2.1.1. The Mediterranean system of governance 
 
In the aim to interrogate the securitising dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in 
the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, a number of clarifications appear necessary. First and foremost, 
this analysis addresses the relationship between the European Union and its Southern Mediterranean 
partners, specifically Egypt and Tunisia. Though this partnership revolves around overlapping 
frameworks of cooperation established since the early 1990s (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Union 
for the Mediterranean among others), the focus will rest primarily on an assessment of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy framework, and more particularly its political and security dialogue dimension 
(or first basket). The broadness of the ENP calls for a specific focus, evidenced here in the choice of 
two particular partner countries: Egypt and Tunisia. The former’s relevance involves its role as a 
traditional and strategic partner for the EU in the region, not least by virtue of its position as a 
regional broker, particularly in the context of the Middle-East Peace Process. On the other hand, 
Tunisia has often been described as the most liberalised Arab partner, while being the only instance of 
a -relatively- successful democratic transition in the aftermath of the social uprisings. Those 
characteristics create a particularly strong incentive for the EU to encourage the latest developments 
in Tunisia as well as further promote democratic change in Egypt.  
 
The specific focus on Egypt and Tunisia should be regarded as an attempt to bypass a methodological 
problem inscribed in the study of the European foreign policy in the MENA region. Indeed, the 
numerous frameworks of cooperation do not always involve the same groups of states, which, as P.J. 
Cardwell has argued, echoes the EU’s vision of the Mediterranean not as a strictly delimited 
geographic area, but rather as a variable object for the Union’s focus. This relative flexibility shown 
by the EU in its Mediterranean policies mirrors the role of the EU’s foreign policy as a mean to assert 
its central position in the Mediterranean system of governance.16 Furthermore, Cardwell notes the fact 
that “non-MSs participate in the pursuit of ‘internal’ EU policy goals whilst remaining ‘outsiders’”, a 
direct consequence of the EU’s normative agenda as well as of the lack of membership perspective for 
Southern Mediterranean partner states.17 This may reinforce the claim that the Union’s self-assertion 
as a normative example participates in an identity-building mechanism. 
 
2.1.2. Foreign policy and identity 
 
This argument, which echoes debates around EU actor-hood on the global stage, is further 
rooted in David Campbell’s two conceptions of foreign policy. In his analysis of United States 
Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, he argues that foreign policy not only consists in the 
external representation of a state, but is also “one of the boundary-producing practices central to the 
                                                                                                      
16 Cardwell, P. (2010). EuroMed, European neighbourhood policy and the union for the Mediterranean: 
Overlapping policy frames in the EU's governance of the Mediterranean. JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 49(2), pp.224. 
17 Ibid., p.220. 
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production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates.”18 Following this constructivist 
approach to the study of foreign policy implies to consider it essentially as a discursive practice. It 
also mirrors Benedict Anderson’s vision of identity as an ongoing process, shaped, constructed and 
challenged continuously; in other words emphasising the discursively constructed nature of identity.19 
The notion of discursive practice in this context thus echoes the idea of narratives, described by Ben 
Tonra as the “articulation of identity that is derived from discourse.”20 The Normative Power Europe 
concept is  a good instance of this phenomenon, for it rests on a projected perception of normative 
performance, which finds its source in a narrative of EU exceptionalism, a projected image of the EU 
as “acting differently, more correctly, more ethically, or more appropriately than have earlier foreign 
policy actors or competing foreign  policy actors.”21 The instantiation of identity through discursive 
practices may thus participate in the creation of an “imagined community.”22 This interpretation may 
inform constructivist approaches to international relations: it may in particular contribute to a new 
vision of European foreign policy in the Mediterranean. Michelle Pace developed this type of 
interpretation at several occasions: she indeed “presented [European foreign policy] as a discursive 
activity that constructs the Mediterranean as one of its Other - a necessary process for European self-
definition.”23As a key instrument for border management, the ENP and its policy documents are the 
objects of specific narratives, which affect EU vision of the Southern Mediterranean as well as its 
self-perception. Two narratives are particularly influential in the formulation of EU external relations, 
while they mirror Huber’s interpretation of EU democracy promotion policies: the threat/risk security 
narrative and the normative duty narrative.24    
 
2.2. Theories of democracy promotion 
 
As events unfolded in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, commentators such as Orbie, 
Bossuyt and Wetzel identified a lack of democratic substance behind the EU’s democracy promotion 
discourse. Significant research has been conducted on the type of democracy that is being promoted 
by the EU, and this paper seeks to identify discursive configurations of democracy promotion in ENP 
policy papers, more than to investigate actual mechanisms of democracy promotion on the ground.25 It 
endorses an essentially goal-oriented definition of democracy promotion, resting on Christopher Hill’s 
description, which describes it as “all foreign policy activities which aim at fostering transition to, 
consolidation of, or improvement of democracy in other states and their societies.”26 However, this 
broad definition fails to acknowledge the fairly complex and intricate understanding of democracy 
revealed by the analysis of European Neighbourhood Policy documents. 
                                                                                                      
18 Campbell, D. (1992). Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. 1st ed. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, p.75. 
19 Tonra, B. (2011). Democratic foundations of EU foreign policy: narratives and the myth of EU 
exceptionalism. Journal of European Public Policy, [online] 18(8), p.1193. 
20 Ibid., p.1194. 
21 Sjursen, H. (2011). The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: the quest for democracy. Journal of 
European Public Policy, [online] 18(8), p.128. 
22 Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 2nd ed. 
London: Verso. 
23 Pace, M. (2002). The Ugly Duckling of Europe: The Mediterranean in the Foreign Policy of the European 
Union. Journal of European Area Studies, [online] 10(2), pp.189-190. 
24 Schumacher, T. (2015). Uncertainty at the EU's borders: narratives of EU external relations in the revised 
European Neighbourhood Policy towards the southern borderlands. European Security, [online] 24(3), p.384. 
25 Pace, M. (2010). Interrogating the European Union's Democracy Promotion Agenda: Discursive 
Configurations of 'Democracy' from the Middle East. European Foreign Affairs Review, [online] 15(5), pp.611-
628.  
26 Hill, C. (2002) The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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2.2.1. Coercive, utilitarian and identitive types of democracy promotion 
 
In a comparative analysis of EU and US democracy promotion policies, Daniela Huber 
developed three axis for research: targets, instruments and content.27 Within the framework of this 
paper, the targets are clearly identified; it investigates the relationship between the EU on the one 
hand, Egypt and Tunisia on the other. Secondly, she identified three general types of instruments for 
democracy promotion: coercive, utilitarian and finally identitive. While military intervention is not 
discussed throughout this paper, as it is in no way relevant in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, utilitarian 
and identitive types of democracy promotion find a particular resonance in the argument underlying 
this thesis. Indeed, the utilitarian type is highly relevant as it revolves around positive and negative 
conditionality, which play an important role within the context of EU foreign policy in the 
Mediterranean. Identitive democracy promotion is embedded in the discursive configurations of an 
actor’s policy discourse and ‘speech acts’, and as such, it may inform this understanding of the EU’s 
foreign policy discourse in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. More particularly, it mirrors the 
dialectical relationship between democratic role identity and threat perception, apprehended here via 
the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School. 
 
2.2.2. Democracy promotion and the theories of international relations 
 
            A variety of approaches have been used in the study of democracy promotion policies, often 
with a particular focus on either the United States or the European Union. The following description 
in no way seeks exhaustivity; it is merely an overview of the field. At the heart of scholarly attention 
on democracy promotion policies, lies a questioning over the reasons that incite nations - the United 
States - or international organisations - the European Union - to promote democratic governance 
abroad.  As we have already mentioned earlier, the 2003 European Security Strategy identified 
democracy as a prerequisite for a secure international milieu. The security dimension in that 
description resonates with a structural realist view, that tends to present democracy promotion as a 
“second-order normative concern”, with the sole purpose to protect vital security or economic 
interests. Adrian Hyde-Price, a tenant of neorealist thought, insisted particularly on the dismissal of 
the Normative Europe concept, and claimed that the EU remains an instrument for the Member States 
to influence the international milieu, including soft power policies such as democracy promotion. 
On the contrary, liberal idealism presents norms, values and knowledge as driving forces for 
democracy promotion. It emphasises interdependence, and a form of international institutionalisation 
resting on the shared belief in said norms and values. It assumes that the EU, as an atypical type of 
international organisation, may wish to push other nations toward a similar form a political 
construction. In other words, it stresses the normative content of EU foreign policy as an objective in 
itself, not as a means to achieve other purposes. 
Furthermore, democracy promotion policies have been approached through critical theories of 
international relations; those share a focus on power relations between states. The notion of 
hegemony, particularly present in marxist theory, has been applied extensively to the realm of 
international relations; Antonio Gramsci has for instance been keen on showing how hegemony is 
maintained through the propagation of a common culture. This so-called cultural hegemony may 
participate in understanding the power mechanisms underlying EU - and US in more acute terms - 
democracy promotion policies. 
                                                                                                      
27 Huber, D. (2013). US and EU Human Rights and Democracy Promotion since the Arab Spring. Rethinking its 
Content, Targets and Instruments. The International Spectator, [online] 48(3), pp.98-112. 
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 Finally, constructivist approaches - a somewhat vaster ensemble that contains some liberal idealist 
notions - interrogate the role of identity in foreign policy and international relations as a whole. They 
find a particular echo in concepts such as Ian Manners’ Normative Power Europe. Their emphasis on 
the endogeneity and socially-constructed nature of identities and interests of political actors may 
inform understandings of the normative element in EU foreign policy. In her study of the 
neighbourhood policy, Michelle Pace also interrogated the discursive configurations of ‘democracy’ 
in the Middle-East, emphasising the self-construction of the EU as a normative power through its 
engagement with its Southern neighbourhood. 
As a result, this paper draws on critical and constructivist approaches to democracy promotion, using 
Foucauldian theories of power and discourse as well as Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse 
Analysis. It also attempts to test Daniela Huber’s theory on the dialectical relationship between 
normative and strategic aspects in democracy promotion policies against EU foreign policy discourse 
after the Arab uprisings. It presupposes that Huber’s findings will find particular resonance in a 
critical discourse analysis of the ENP policy documents related to Egypt and Tunisia. 
 
2.3. Democracy promotion in its strategic and normative contexts: threat perception - democratic role 
identity 
 
2.3.1. Threat perception constrains democracy promotion (Argument 1) 
 
This interpretation of security threat rests on Barry Buzan’s definition, who presents it as 
“when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object.”28 The 
rhetorical dimension inscribed in this description is thus very much in line with Huber’s idea of threat 
perception. It assumes that the more insecure an international environment becomes - or is perceived 
as such - the less democracy promotion policies tend to be vigorously pursued. More specifically, 
threat perception participates in challenging the identitive democracy promotion discourse of the 
European Union. The threat/risk security narrative locates the EU at the heart of spaces of security 
and stability, thus participating in the self-centredness of EU security discourse.29 This is a particular 
instance of a securitisation practice, as it fuels the threat perception at EU level. Moreover, it 
accentuates the relevance of a neighbourhood policy in addressing security threats. 
 
2.3.2. Democratic role identity limits the hindering effect of threat perception on democracy 
promotion (Argument 2) 
 
According to D. Huber, EU democratic role identity answers to three dynamics: firstly, the 
norms it attempts to promote are constitutive of its identity, at least on the rhetorical level, since they 
are specifically referred to as the “values of the Union.”30 Secondly, the promotion of those values has 
been institutionalised through numerous frameworks of cooperation since the launch of the Barcelona 
Process in 1995. It is an important aspect of most key ENP policy documents, speeches as well as a 
number of more specific instruments such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR) European Endowment for Democracy (EED). Finally, it answers to the necessity to 
engage with a neighbourhood, and can be labelled as a democratic role identity because it is anchored 
                                                                                                      
28 Buzan, B., Waever, O. and de Wilde, J. (1997). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 1st ed. Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.21. 
29 Christou, G. (2010). European Union security logics to the east: the European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
Eastern Partnership. European Security, [online] 19(3), pp.413-430. 
30 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 8, 2008 O.J., C 115/20. 
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in a process of identification of the Southern partner countries as other than the EU.31 Narratives of 
the EU as a democracy promoter, as well as the accent on “good neighbourliness” at EU borderlands, 
refer to the normative character of EU foreign policy. They constitute a “normative duty narrative” 
according to Tobias Schumacher.32 The acknowledgment of particular threats in its vicinity, along 
with its democratic role identity and confidence in the norms it promote, pushes the EU toward action 
in the Southern Mediterranean. Eventually, these dynamics appear self-reinforcing: the identification 
of Egypt and Tunisia in particular as key recipient countries for the EU’s democracy promotion 
efforts justifies the external action in the region as well as contributes to shape the image of the EU as 
a normative actor.  
 
2.4. Going a step further: democracy promotion and securitisation theory 
 
2.4.1. Discursive processes and threat perception: towards a securitisation of the partnership 
 
This section relates to the increasingly securitised nature of the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership since the start of the Barcelona Process in 1995. Barry Buzan contends that “the exact 
definition and criteria of securitisation is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an 
existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects,” adding that “the issue 
is securitised if and when the audience accepts it as such.”33 This constructivist approach to security 
studies, embedded in the works of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, rests on a process-
oriented conception of security. The Copenhagen School, as it was later coined, developed a 
comprehensive ‘securitisation theory’, resting on the idea that the world is socially constructed, 
including security threats, through discursive processes, or what Ole Waever described as securitising 
“speech acts”.34 Therefore, securitisation theory may constitute a valuable framework of analysis in 
order to understand how political turmoil in the MENA affected the dominant normative narrative of 
the European neighbourhood policy discourse. Politicised and depicted as security threats, elements of 
instability - migration, internal upheaval, terrorism, polarisation along a secular/Islamist divide and 
the deteriorating economic situation to follow a February 2013 European Commission MEMO - have 
been subject to particular discursive configurations which participated in their securitisation and may 
motivate extraordinary activities undertaken as a mean to tackle them.35  
 
The renewed ENP seemed to increasingly acknowledge the role of socio-economic conditions in 
Southern Mediterranean as a root cause for upheaval, illegal migration and radicalisation. This 
approach fits well within the general narrative developed at EU level in the aftermath of the Arab 
uprisings. It resonated particularly with the state of play published in 2013 by the European 
Commission; indeed, the introductory paragraph emphasised “outstanding security challenges” and 
echoed the securitisation logics employed in neighbourhood policies. It outlined the role of a 
“deteriorating economic situation” in regional instability.36 The justification for EU action in the 
                                                                                                      
31 Stetter, S. (2005). The politics of De-Paradoxification in Euro-Mediterranean relations: Semantics and 
structures of 'cultural dialogue'. Mediterranean Politics, 10(3), p.334. 
32 Schumacher, T. (2015). Uncertainty at the EU's borders: narratives of EU external relations in the revised 
European Neighbourhood Policy towards the southern borderlands. European Security, [online] 24(3), p.389. 
33 Buzan, B., Waever, O. and de Wilde, J. (1997). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 1st ed. Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.25. 
34 Weaver, O. (1989). Security, The Speech Act. Analysing the Politics of a Word. Jerusalem: Training Research 
Seminar. 
35 European Commission, (2013). EU’s response to the Arab Spring: the state-of-play after two years. Brussels: 
MEMO/13/81. 
36 Ibid. 
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MENA therefore rests upon the depiction of the Southern neighbourhood as an increasingly unstable 
environment. From the failure of past stabilising policies in the region comes the promise of greater 
future involvement. 
 
2.4.2. Interrogating the crisis rhetoric of the European Union 
 
“Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted in those crises.”37 
 
This paper contends that any answer by the EU to a pressing challenge entails a process of self-
representation that affects both its internal development and outsiders’ perception of the European 
project.  
 
For instance, the literature on the 2008 global financial and subsequent Eurozone crises pointed as 
much to the uncertainty of the situation as to the political opportunity it represented. The phenomenon 
is evidenced by the etymological root of the term, taking its origin in the Ancient Greek κρίση (krisi), 
or ‘decision, choice, judgment.’ Jessica C. Lawrence paid particular attention to the EU crisis rhetoric 
as a political discourse. She approached the space of crisis as a “discursive construction—a narrative 
that describes a set of facts, ordering them to produce a representation of crisis.”38   
 
As a result, this paper seeks to interrogate EU discursive practices in its key ENP policy documents, 
as a mean to question the role of crisis rhetoric as a particular instance of a securitising discursive 
practice. Drawing on Foucauldian conceptions of power and knowledge, it argues that far from being 
a neutral assessment of a given situation, it is a particular knowledge-producing discursive 
construction of events. It eventually contends that this articulation of events into crises fuels 
emergency and politicisation of particular issues, participating in their securitisation in the form of 
their depiction as fundamental security threats.  
 
This thesis argues that acute political instability in EU neighbourhood undermined the dominance of 
narratives of good neighbourliness and of the EU as a democracy promoter, captured in the ‘ring of 
friends’ concept.39 Additionally, the securitisation rhetoric of ENP discourse was predominantly 
centred around ‘classic’ security threats in the 2003 Wider Europe report: “terrorism and transnational 
organised crime, customs  and taxation fraud, nuclear environment hazards and communicable 
diseases” were indeed established as priorities. Instead, post-2011 documents evidence the fact that 
ENP securitisation logics spilled-over to new sectors of policy-making, with a particularly strong 
accent on migration and a greater recognition of the impact of “deteriorating socioeconomic 
conditions” on human movement and radicalisation. This seemed to constitute a comprehensive crisis 
rhetoric, which located the solution in further stabilising policies in the MENA. This paper discusses 
recent developments in the formulation of ENP and eventually observes a discrepancy between EU 
policies in the region, increasingly informed by a threat narrative, and the expectations of local 
populations, where socio-economic change dominate wishes for democratic transition.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                      
37 Monnet, J. (1978). Memoirs. 1st ed. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, p.417. 
38 Lawrence, J. (2013). The EU in Crisis: Crisis Discourse as a Technique of Government. Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 2013, [online] 44, p.190. 
39 Commission of the European Communities, (2003). Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. Brussels: COM(2003) 104 final, p.4. 
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2.5. Research question 
 
Accordingly, to what extent does the EU neighbourhood policy discourse in the aftermath of the 
Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings constitute a further challenge to the normative dimension of 
the Union’s external action in the region and an evidence of the increasing securitisation of the 
partnership between the EU and its Southern neighbours?  
Furthermore, has the EU altered its discursive approach to the Southern Mediterranean in the years 
that followed political transitions in both countries? 
What do the discursive configurations of the neighbourhood policy reveal about the way the EU 
perceives its Southern neighbours and its own external action? 
Finally, can the EU hope to maintain a certain influence in the region as a whole, and remain a 
relevant democracy promotion actor, or the relative failure of its normative influence will bring it 
back to a more bilateral kind of relationships, captured in the calls for more ‘differentiation?’”40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                      
40 European Commission, (2015). Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels: JOIN(2015) 50 
final, p.2. 
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Chapter Three: Methodological considerations 
 
 
 
3.1. Discourse analysis 
 
“We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive 
formation […] Discourse is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of 
existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form […] it is, from beginning to end, 
historical – a fragment of history […] posing its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes 
of its temporality.”41  
 
The elected methodological framework for this research is one that answers to the logic of the 
discourse analysis. It follows Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse, while drawing on Norman 
Fairclough’s three dimensional model. Discourse is thereby understood as (1) language use as a 
social practice, (2) the kind of language used in a specific field and finally as (3) a way of speaking 
which gives meaning to experiences from a particular perspective.42 Therefore, it encompasses both 
written and spoken text, as well as visuals and images, though this analysis dealt with an 
overwhelming majority of written text samples. Among other tools for textual analysis, Fairclough 
insisted particularly on ethos - how identities are constructed through language, metaphors, wording 
and grammar.43  
This approach may provide for a better understanding of the intricate narratives embedded in a 
political discourse through a study of the lexical fields, themes, keywords and discursive practices 
used by a policy actor (or set of actors). The textual content of a number of ENP policy documents is 
analysed using the online software VOYANT Tools, developed by Stéfan Sinclair (McGill 
University) and Geoffrey Rockwell (University of Alberta). It allows for a simpler analysis of 
discursive patterns while providing clear, well-designed graphic representations. 
 
Chapter Four analyses the main ENP policy documents published by the European Commission and 
the European External Action Service since the 2011 Arab uprisings. Meant as a quick response to the 
turmoil in the neighbourhood, A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood:  a review of European 
Neighbourhood Policy was issued in 2011. Moreover, it examines the 2015 Review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. It eventually compares the “renewed” ENP design with the 2003 
Communication Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours.  
 
Chapter Five and Six scrutinise the Action Plans and Progress Reports addressing the relationship 
with Egypt and Tunisia. Particular attention is paid to newly emphasised ENP concepts - stability, 
differentiation and ownership - as well as an evident emphasis on civil society assistance. These two 
sections attempt to take into account specific developments relevant to the Egyptian and Tunisian 
contexts, and thus follow different structural patterns. 
 
Among the few studies of ENP democracy promotion discourse in the aftermath of the Arab 
uprisings, very few have been the result of thorough textual analysis. This paper, more concerned with 
                                                                                                      
41 Foucault, M. (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge. 1st ed. New-York: Pantheon Books, p.117. 
42 Jorgensen, M. and Phillips, L. (2002). Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. 1st ed. London: SAGE 
Publications Ltd, p.67. 
43 Ibid., p.83. 
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ENP discursive practices rather than implementation on the ground, is one step toward bridging this 
gap in the literature on EU external action.  
 
3.2. A Foucauldian approach to power and knowledge 
 
“What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does not only weigh 
on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, 
produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social 
body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression”.44  
 
A critical approach to discourse is employed: the analysis of discursive practices within the European 
Union’s foreign policy narrative aims at underlying power relations and the intricate role that 
discourse plays in constructing, shaping or challenging them. 
Based on Foucault, it can be assumed that power relationships, structured through the discursive 
practices of multiple actors, continually participate in shaping and transforming the social world. The 
intrinsically connected nature of power and discourse thus reveals the social world as an intricate 
network of interconnected, self-produced representations that originate from the discursive practices 
of a multiplicity of actors. At the heart of “Foucault’s coupling of power and knowledge” is a 
questioning around the issue of truth, hereby “understood as a system of procedures for the 
production, regulation and diffusion of statements.”45 This archaeological phase of Foucault’s 
philosophical thought was later sharpened, and truth was later described as “embedded in, and 
produced by, systems of power.”46 Pulling away from truthfulness, the articulation of various pictures 
of the social reality within discursive practices and how these constructions impact on social actors is 
thus brought to the fore. 
 
Rooted in poststructuralist theory, analytical discourse approaches contend that representations of a 
given reality are constructed through language, and that these representations participate in 
constructing social reality itself.47 This attention to the institutional context of production and 
integration of a specific discursive pattern may be very valuable in the context of the EU. Drawing on 
Foucauldian interpretations, particularly those presented in the Archaeology of Knowledge, may also 
help grasp the importance of discourse as an articulation of power and knowledge that manifests 
institutionalised patterns of knowledge. 
 
At the institutional level, the emphasis on and recurrence of specific themes may reveal the creation of 
a particular discursive strategy. Such strategy may manifest the articulation of a narrative presenting 
the EU as a normative actor, emphasising its distinctiveness through its (supposed) capacity to trigger 
change in other partners. It may also reveal a particular emphasis on specific security issues, echoing a 
securitising approach to the ENP.  
A discourse analysis appears particularly well-suited to understand and apply the theoretical 
framework inscribed in the dialectical relationship between democratic role identity and threat 
perception. It also serves the objective to identify particular discursive configurations, central to 
securitisation theory. 
                                                                                                      
44 Foucault, M. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. 1st ed. New-
York: Pantheon Books, p.119. 
45 Jorgensen, M. and Phillips, L. (2002). Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. 1st ed. London: SAGE 
Publications Ltd, p.14. 
46 Ibid., p.14. 
47 Ibid., p.9. 
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3.3. Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Critical discourse analysis consists in a rather large body of thought, encompassing multiple 
approaches to language and discourse. Those approaches share a focus on the linguistic-discursive 
dimension of the social world as well as processes of change in the discursive practices of its actors.48 
Moreover, they contend that discourse is both constitutive and constituted; in that it recognises the 
influence of non-discursive societal forces on discourse, CDA differs from other approaches such as 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory.49 CDA further establishes that discourse cannot be analysed 
without paying thorough attention to its social context of production. Finally it points to the role of 
discourse in creating and reproducing unequal power relations within society.  
 
Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis approach is characterised by its three-dimensional framework. 
It sees a text (an instance of discourse), a discursive practice and a social practice.50 As a mean to 
understand processes of change in discursive practices, Fairclough paid particular attention to 
intertextuality, or the linkages between the discourse studied and elements of prior texts.51 Following 
Fairclough’s theory, interdiscursivity, a subcategory of intertextuality, is characterised by the 
articulation of diverse types of discourse within a single text; it may thus reveal a process of change in 
the discursive practices of a given social actor. Fairclough’s understanding of the order of discourse, 
which shapes and is shaped by all discursive practices, is central to this analytical approach. As of the 
third dimension, it consists in Fairclough’s terms in the enquiry into the “social matrix of discourse.”52 
It points to the role of a particular discursive sample within a larger web of textual content; it 
emphasises its effect on the wider power relations it is embedded in. This is a central element of 
Fairclough’s CDA, as it implies the use of other theories of social sciences, as a mean to understand 
the complex social, economic or institutional non-discursive elements to which discourse is subject. It 
stresses the importance of multi-perspectival types of studies, and the merits of research across 
boundaries. 
 
However, it also gives rise to a number of difficulties in the direct implementation of  CDA. 
Fairclough invites the researcher to remain weary of the impact of his/her language in shaping, 
creating or reproducing existing power relations. He calls for critical language awareness, raising 
important ethical considerations as to the instrumentalisation - technologisation - of the researcher’s 
findings.53 Furthermore, CDA appears to rests upon a rather vague distinction between discursive and 
non-discursive elements; giving a thorough account of the social practice dimension may thus be 
highly unpractical at best. To this theoretical weakness can be added a relative neglect of social 
psychological aspects: processes of group formation, construction of social identities and social 
relations are notably under-researched in Fairclough’s approach. Last but not least, CDA approaches, 
in spite of Fairclough’s emphasis on that particular element, seem to share a certain lack of interest for 
text production and text consumption practices, however crucial to the general coherence of the 
theoretical framework he developed. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                      
48 Ibid., p.61. 
49 Ibid., p.62. 
50 Ibid., p.68. 
51 Ibid., p.7. 
52 Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and Social Change. 1st ed. Cambridge: Polity press, p.237. 
53 Ibid., p.239. 
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Chapter Four: Discursive configurations of democracy promotion in the ENP since 2011 
 
 
 
 
This study of ENP discourse after the Arab uprisings is rooted in the methodological 
considerations presented by Norman Fairclough in his Critical Discourse Analysis. It is inscribed in a 
multi-perspectival approach to textual analysis. Its focus rests on three particular elements of the 
discourse: its specific textual content or linguistic devices; its importance as a discursive practice, or 
the degree of intertextuality it presents with regard to other similar documents; and finally its role as a 
social practice. Before it turns to documents related specifically to Egypt and Tunisia, it scrutinises 
key ENP documents published since the 2011 Arab uprisings: A New Response to a Changing 
Neighbourhood:  a review of European Neighbourhood Policy (2011) and the 2015 Review of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and compares them with the provisions of the 2003 Communication 
Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours.  
 
4.1. Deep and sustainable democracy: a new approach to democracy promotion? 
 
“Deep democracy - “the kind that lasts because the right to vote is accompanied by rights to 
exercise free speech, form competing political parties, receive impartial justice from independent 
judges, security from accountable police and army forces, access to a competent and non-corrupt 
civil service-- and other civil and human rights that many Europeans take for granted, such as the 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.”54  
  
Throughout the new documents issued by the Union, focused on a supposedly innovative vision for 
the ENP, the External Action Service acknowledged the “limited results” of its foreign policy so far, 
as well as the fact that a “new approach is needed” as a response to the ongoing “historical 
challenges.”55 High Representative Baroness Catherine Ashton responded in a similar vein in 
February 2011, as she proclaimed in a Guardian article that “the EU stands ready to help” create “the 
roots of deep democracy.”56      
 
The Communication A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood (NRCN), as a first 
comprehensive institutional response to the events of early 2011, laid down the bases for a new 
democracy promotion approach. It assumed a more repentant tone, and developed a rather fragile 
normative duty narrative, with only occasional statements such as “the EU needs to rise to the 
historical challenges in our neighbourhood.”57 A sense of voluntarism, sensibly weakened since the 
Wider Europe report, remained discernible. The 2003 document talked about a “new impetus”, “new 
opportunities”, insisted on the fact that “the EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens and those of 
the new member states, but also towards it present and future neighbours”, and used a language of 
necessity, of obligation, such as in “the EU must act” or  “will need to rise to meet this challenge.”58 
                                                                                                      
54 European Commission, (2011). A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels: COM(2011) 303, p.2. 
55 Ibid., p.1. 
56 Ashton, C. (2011). The EU wants 'deep democracy' to take root in Egypt and Tunisia. The Guardian. [online]. 
57 European Commission, (2011). A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels: COM(2011) 303, p.1. 
58 Commission of the European Communities, (2003). Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
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The title of the first section, “Wider Europe: Accepting the Challenge,” was an evidence of strong 
political will and a genuine desire to engage with neighbours.59 The NRCN still drew on some of 
these notions, with a significantly attenuated sense of duty and voluntarism. The document introduced 
the deep democracy concept, articulated around five core elements: free and fair elections, freedom of 
association, expression and assembly, rule of law, fight against corruption and finally security and law 
enforcement sector reform. It referred to multiple elements, some of which were not part of the 
traditional democracy assistance package, particularly when it comes to the reform of security and law 
enforcement sector. It represented an attempt to construct a comprehensive democracy promotion 
strategy, with a strong emphasis on civil and political rights.  
 
Nevertheless, it failed to acknowledge the importance of social and economic change in order to 
achieve what the EU conceives as deep democracy. It argued that “reform based on these elements 
will not only strengthen democracy but help to create the conditions for sustainable and inclusive 
economic growth, stimulating trade and investment”, a causal mechanism establishing democracy as 
an essential step toward social and economic improvement.60 On the contrary, this paper contends that 
social and economic development is a necessary step in the process of democracy-building. It bases 
its claims on the findings of the Arab Barometer. Indeed, this comprehensive survey regularly 
conducted in ten countries of the MENA since 2011 indicated that 70% of the respondents in Tunisia 
and Egypt mentioned better economic governance as one of the three main reasons for the uprisings. 
A staggering 75% of Tunisians considered the economic situation as the main challenge faced by their 
countries, while a mere 4% argued the same about democracy in 2016 (Fig. 1).61 Similarly, 82% of 
the Egyptian respondents declared that the state of the economy was their main concern, the second 
most cited concern being security and stability, mentioned by 7% of the people surveyed.62 76% of 
Egyptians considered socio-economic features as the most important priority for democracy-building - 
32% of the respondents emphasised the provision of basic necessities and some 32% more the 
reduction of inequality. Only 23% of the people surveyed believed civil and political rights to be a 
priority for democracy-building.63 Those numbers pointed out to the fact that the yearning of 
Egyptians and Tunisians for democratic governance rests on a singularly more economy-oriented 
understanding of democracy than that conveyed by the EU’s renewed approach. They underscored the 
wishes of a majority of respondents: an improvement in the socio-economic conditions of their 
countries. This paper interprets this data as an evidence that the emphasis on civil and political rights 
in the deep democracy concept failed to capture the expectations of a majority of Egyptians and 
Tunisians in 2011. 
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60 European Commission, (2011). A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A review of European 
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Figure 1. 
 
 
While the democracy promotion section in the NRCN was centred around deep democracy, thorough 
examination of the 2015 ENP Review reveals that the concept was abandoned as quickly as it had 
been introduced. Moreover, whereas democracy-related concerns formed the first section of the 
NRCN, they were postponed to the fourth section in the 2015 Review. An additional semantic change 
can be noted: after the 2011 deep democracy, the 2015 Review chose to emphasise “good 
governance”, thus showing its acceptance of a status quo over calls for further democratisation.64 
Considered as a social practice, the formulation of the NRCN and 2015 Review, as well as the 
formulation of their specific democracy promotion provisions, revealed an attempt to look afresh at 
past ENP policies, and to offer an image of the EU as a voluntary foreign policy actor.  
 
However, the new approach strictly maintained a strong emphasis on civil and political rights, while 
significantly downscaling its objectives in the 2015 Review. The disappearance of deep democracy, 
envisioned as a core principle for future EU action in the NRCN, revealed a significant lack of 
consistency in the formulation of external policy. The ENP discourse adopted a less decisive tone: its 
stated objective was to “propose how the EU and its neighbours can build more effective 
partnerships”, while it recognised that “the EU cannot alone solve the many challenges of the region.65 
More importantly, conditional support from the EU, instrumental in both Wider Europe and the 
NRCN, is absent from the 2015 Review. As a matter of fact, putting an end to this core element of EU 
democracy promotion is an evidence of a new consciousness that past schemes, potentially efficient 
when dealing with seemingly stable authoritarian regimes, could not remain at the heart of EU 
activities in the region.  
In a nutshell, the 2015 Review announced a rupture with the normative duty narrative, and presented 
EU involvement in the neighbourhood as more of a strategic necessity than a normative ambition.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                      
64 European Commission, (2015). Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels: JOIN(2015) 50 
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4.2. Stabilisation, ownership and differentiation 
 
“Our most pressing challenge is the stabilisation of our neighbourhood. Conflicts, terrorism 
and radicalisation threaten us all. But poverty, corruption and poor governance are also sources of 
insecurity. That is why we will refocus relations with our partners where necessary on our genuinely 
shared common interests.”66 
     
A particular ENP speech act can be identified in a guest editorial by Commissioner for 
Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn, published in 2016 in the 
European Foreign Affairs Review. The Communication on the 2015 ENP Review was deemed 
“strategic”, as well as the “culmination” of an inclusive process.67 The publication emphasised the 
importance of the Review to address the “most urgent concerns of the EU and its partners.”68 It stated 
the original purpose of the ENP, stressing the “area of security, stability and prosperity” the EU hoped 
to establish as well as its belief in the fact that it could “project its values.” As it underlined the 
changes in the region, it drew on a rather obvious crisis rhetoric: “conflicts”, “political violence”, 
“transnational terrorism”, “aggressive Russian foreign policy”, “deep migration crisis.”69 In one 
sentence, Commissioner Hahn summed up the issues at EU borders and created a picture of profound 
instability. He further proclaimed the centrality of stabilisation policies in the new ENP.  
 
Furthermore, the introduction of the 2015 Review claimed that “differentiation and greater mutual 
ownership will be the hallmark of the new ENP.”70 These elements pointed to the stabilisation policy 
pursued by the EU in its neighbourhood, to increasing claims of co-ownership - meaning greater 
involvement of partner countries in the formulation of ENP policy documents - as well as greater 
differentiation in the implementation of the models developed. The differentiated approach was not a 
new concept: indeed, both the Wider Europe report and the NRCN promoted a “differentiated 
framework”,71 or “differentiated approach”,72 though they failed to introduce new instruments for its 
implementation. The 2015 Review however, put an end to the system of Progress reports, and claimed 
to introduce a “new style of assessment.”73 This represented a major change in ENP benchmarking, as 
it may give increasing space for EU neighbours to set their own objectives. It may also be considered 
as a statement of weakness on the part of the EU, faced with the failure of its conditionality approach 
in triggering political change in the region. The address of Commissioner Johannes Hahn during the 
presentation of the 2015 Review of the ENP encapsulated all three elements. It pointed to a strategic 
approach, where stability and security concerns superseded normative engagements at the rhetorical 
level. After the rather voluntarist vision proposed by the NRCN in 2011, the situation at EU borders 
prompted decision-makers to adopt a singularly less regional policy, favouring instead engagement 
with specific partners in a framework of co-ownership.   
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A 2016 College of Europe Policy Brief insisted on the discursive aspects of the EU’s response to the 
changes in its Southern neighbourhood, and highlighted the notion of the ring of fire -as a reference to 
the previously endorsed idea of the “ring of friends.”74 The significant change in tone, or crisis 
rhetoric developed by EU policy-makers in the context of the 2015 ENP Review, appeared in sharp 
contrast with the reform enacted in 2011. Schumacher underlined particularly the stabilising agenda 
of the document – the section Stabilising the Neighbourhood follows the introduction – which 
presented striking differences with the NRCN, largely focused on the development of long-term policy 
objectives. The 2015 document promoted a more careful approach, with stabilisation as its guideline. 
A stabilising agenda was introduced for new policy areas: it was to preside over future crisis 
management capacities, economic development cooperation, financial instruments, security programs 
and migration. This last element, in the context of high migratory pressure at EU borders, represented 
a very recent addition to the mandate of ENP. The small migration section in Wider Europe focused 
primarily on “lawful migration and the movement of persons”, with some five lines of text dedicated 
to combating illegal migration.75 The NRCN presented a similar focus, insisting on the negotiation of 
Mobility Partnerships and Visa liberalisation. The 2015 Review represented an important step, as it 
contained a comprehensive three-pages long framework to deal with “mutually beneficial migration 
and mobility”, “protection for those in need”, “tackling irregular migration” and “cooperation on 
border management.”76 The EU considerably stepped up its ENP provisions related to migration, with 
a significant emphasis on the importance of stabilising policies in its neighbourhood and an increasing 
focus on border management capacities.  
This thesis contends that those semantic changes in the formulation of ENP constitute a narrative of 
threat, in sharp contrast with the voluntarist tone employed in early ENP documents. (Fig. 2). The 
2003 Wider Europe had been drafted in the context of rising threat perception related to terrorism, but 
the dynamic of enlargement prompted action in the neighbourhood, and high confidence in the ability 
of the Union to be an actor of change in the region. This analysis points to a certain crisis rhetoric in 
ENP policy documents, instantiated in the stabilising agenda of the 2015 Review. Nevertheless, along 
these developments, one area of democracy promotion received increasing attention in ENP: civil 
society assistance.  
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Figure 2: Recurrence of selected keywords in the 2011 New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood 
and the 2015 European Neighbourhood Policy Review. Table created by the author.  
 
 
  Democracy Stability Security Civil 
society 
Threat Ownership Flexibility Differentiation 
2011 
NRCN 
24 0 31 15 1 0 4 3 
2015 
Review 
10 9 44 15 4 5 7 2 
 
4.3. Disrupting a securitised agenda: the potential of civil society assistance 
 
“Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, 
purpose and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and 
market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often 
complex, blurred and negotiated. (...) Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as 
registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women’s 
organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, 
social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.”  
  
While provisions concerning democracy promotion have been significantly downscaled since the 
launch of ENP in 2003, and even more so during the 2015 review exercise, civil society assistance 
became a central instrument in EU democracy promotion rhetoric. Rather non-existent in Wider 
Europe, with only two short remarks about the importance of cooperation with CSOs, civil society 
support gained importance in the NRCN, with a full section dedicated to the “partnership with 
societies.”77 The NRCN emphasised support to “political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade 
unions and other social partners”, a considerable novelty for democracy promotion policies.78 Indeed, 
this implied engagement on the ground, with partners other than those sponsored by the states, in a 
framework which, to some degree, bypassed traditional cooperation between the EU and state 
authorities. The numerous references made to civil society in the NRCN and the 2015 Review 
answered to the failure of conditional EU-state cooperation in democracy promotion, while fitting the 
differentiated approach desired by the EU and its partners. Its focus is on inclusiveness, in the 
endeavour to open-up neighbouring political scenes to a wider range of political actors. This goal was 
announced in statements such as “the EU will engage with all partners in an inclusive dialogue”, “sub-
national, national and intra-regional civil society should be supported further” or “expand outreach to 
relevant members of civil society in its broadest sense”.79 It fed rather obviously on a narrative of 
inclusiveness, a seemingly important addition to the democracy assistance agenda of the Union.  
Between 1998 and 2008, the number of CSOs in Egypt, including NGOs, advocacy organisations, 
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business associations and professional and labour groups -following a general classification derived 
from the Comparative Non-profit Sector Project of John Hopkins University (1989-2005)-  grew from 
around 10 000 to 30 000.80 In Tunisia, the EU documented the creation of some 2 700 new CSOs 
between early 2011 and the summer 2012.81 Nonetheless, a number of trends still hinder the capacity 
of Arab CSOs to yield significant influence: the extant grasp of government-led structures on civil 
society, the lack of domestic support for Western-inspired CSOs, the lack of transparency and funding 
as well as its overall fragmented nature participate in explaining the relative slump of civil society 
actors in the context of the Arab uprisings.82 The Tunisian example did however present some striking 
differences with this assessment.  
 
Under the headlines of “civil society engagement”, “decentralised cooperation”, the new ENP was 
partly shaped as a channel for support to local CSOs, a strategy that struggled to gain legitimacy since 
its instigation under the 1995 Barcelona Process.83 Under the 2006 European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR), the EU freed itself from the consent of local authorities. Dotted with 
some €24 million over the 2007-2011 period, the platform experienced some transformations in the 
aftermath of the uprisings.84 Indeed, both the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity and 
Europe’s engagement with civil society in external relations, adopted respectively in March 2011 and 
September 2012, emphasised the need for a more “inclusive” and “country-specific” support to CSOs. 
Two new instruments completed this change: the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility as well as the 
European Endowment for Democracy. Although their creation is too recent to draw conclusions for 
their activities, they did mirror a willingness from the EU to adapt its democracy promotion 
instruments to the changes affecting the region as well as a capacity to take innovative steps in this 
respect. 
 
The whole range of considerations presented above should push the EU towards a cautious approach 
in its strategy for engaging with Arab civil society. Nevertheless, the development of a consistent civil 
society assistance may allow the Union to unlock the situation it finds itself in. The securitisation of 
the Southern partnership under the form of the development of a comprehensive stabilising agenda 
failed to address the expectations of Arab populations and represented a notable setback for ENP 
democracy promotion policies. The voluntarist tone of Wider Europe and the ‘innovative’ vision for 
the ENP presented in the NRCN shifted toward a dominant stabilisation narrative. In this picture of 
stalled democracy promotion agenda, rising calls for civil society support did represent an innovative 
approach to EU external action in the MENA. It remains to be seen whether the EU has been truly 
consistent in its support to CSOs in Egypt and Tunisia since the 2011 upheavals, and whether such 
assistance represents an added-value for democracy promotion in the region. 
 
4.4. Preliminary conclusions 
 
While classic EU democracy promotion policies under the ENP have failed to offer adequate 
and consistent answers to the Arab uprisings, partly due to a growing securitising agenda, civil society 
assistance has been considerably stepped up. More particularly, the deep democracy concept 
introduced in 2011 failed to capture the expectations of Arab populations. It also represented one of 
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the last instances of EU normative duty narrative and voluntarism, as the following 2015 Review of 
the ENP significantly downscaled the objectives and engagement of democracy promotion policies 
under the ENP framework. As stabilisation became the apparent hallmark of ENP policies in the 
MENA, policy documents stood by established paradigms and developed a more cautious tone 
regarding engagement in Egypt and Tunisia. On the discursive level, stability became associated with 
most policy issues, from economic cooperation to energy routes, from migration management to 
political governance. Nevertheless, when it comes to civil society support, it seems that the ENP 
democracy promotion discourse may free itself from established paradigms as well as broaden its 
scope of action. Offering assistance to political parties, non-registered NGOs or trade unions is an 
instance of EU involvement with a growing number of local actors. The seemingly lower levels of 
intertextuality with regard to civil society assistance may be an evidence of this phenomenon.  The 
EU has remained very cautious in this respect, as engagement with non regime-sponsored local actors 
may jeopardise its relationship with the state authorities. Among numerous differences between 
Egyptian and Tunisian politics since the uprisings, the involvement of competing actors in policy-
making, as well as CSOs stands out particularly. While scholarship highlighted the role of CSOs in 
the Tunisian transitional process, in Egypt competing voices have been remarked by their 
absence.  Scrutiny of documents specifically related to Egypt and Tunisia may inform our 
understanding of ENP democracy promotion agenda and the changes it underwent since 2011.  
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Chapter Five: Case Study 1 - Egypt 
 
 
 
To the general scrutiny of key ENP documents, carried out in the previous chapter, must be 
added the analysis of text samples related specifically to Egypt and Tunisia. Though they do not 
presume exhaustivity, chapter five and six share this focus on Action plans, progress reports and other 
documents dealing with these two countries, with a more particular emphasis on their democracy 
promotion sections. As discussed above, the contractual obligations contained in the Action Plans 
were designed to test the commitment of partner countries, and reward them for the progress 
accomplished. Nevertheless, the 2015 Review pulled away from this more-for-more approach, in an 
attempt to secure the stability of transitional regimes in the region. Two types of support from the EU 
can be distinguished: a sector-based financial support to state actors on the one hand, and civil society 
assistance on the other. While the former has failed to bring about significant political change in 
MENA countries, the latter does appear as a recent added-value to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. 
As it cannot hope to offer accurate scrutiny of the whole period since the 2011 regime change, the 
following section emphasises four main elements: the strategic relationship between the EU and 
Egypt, the response to the 2013 military coup, the 2015 legislative elections and finally the support to 
civil society actors.  
 
5.1. EU-Egypt: A Strategic Relationship 
 
The relationship between the EU and Egypt is based on a mutual strategic importance. Indeed, 
on the one hand Egypt is the biggest Arab country, as well as an important regional broker, 
particularly in the context of the Middle-East peace process. With 3.4 million people leaving the 
country in 2013, the World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016 also estimated it to be 
one of the biggest emigration states in the Middle-East, behind the West Bank and Gaza (4.0) and the 
Syrian Arab Republic (4.0).85 However, it is mainly a transit country, a characteristic explained by its 
geographic position between North Africa and the Middle-East. As such, it plays a major role in the 
external migration policies of the European Union. Egypt also is an important partner in counter-
terrorism policies. On the other, the EU remains Egypt’s first trading partner and second donor after 
the Gulf states.86 After the completion of the Association Agreement in 2004, the volume of bilateral 
trade more than doubled in 8 years, reaching €23.9 billion in 2012, up from €11.5 billion in 2004.87 It 
can be noted that the framework for this cooperation remains the Association Agreement signed in 
2001 and entered into force in 2004. In spite of dramatic changes in the political, social and economic 
landscape of the country, the terms of the partnership have hence not been re-defined. Furthermore, 
the EU granted Egypt a one-year Single Support Framework -as opposed to Tunisia’s new Action 
Plan 2013-2017- which reveals a stronger belief in negative conditionality and fails to acknowledge 
Egypt’s “considerably more capital-intensive” need for external assistance.88 The EU chose to inscribe 
the partnership in a short-term perspective through the Single Support Framework, an evidence of 
difficult negotiations with Egypt’s authorities and a lack of vision from the part of the EU. 
                                                                                                      
85 World Bank, (2016). Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016, 3rd Edition. Washington, DC: World Bank, 
p.19. 
86 Pinfari, M. (2013). The EU, Egypt and Morsi's Rise and Fall: ‘Strategic Patience’ and Its Discontents. 
Mediterranean Politics, [online] 18(3), p.460. 
87 Ibid., p.460. 
88 Schumacher, T. (2016). Back to the Future: The ‘New’ ENP towards the Southern Neighbourhood and the 
End of Ambition. College of Europe Policy Brief. [online] Bruges: CEPOB, p.3. 
    
27  
The strategic importance of this partnership may explain the absence of a strong democracy 
promotion commitment throughout the documents related to Egypt: a wide range of objectives were 
mentioned in the 2007 Action Plan, without a proper benchmarking system in order to evaluate 
progress. The European Court of Auditors itself stated that “the action plan [2007] contained as many 
as 39 priority actions in the field of human rights and democracy”, which “represented an overly 
ambitious agenda which was not based on clearly spelled out priorities on the part of the 
Commission.”89 In the 2014-2016 Single Support Framework (SSF) however, the themes of political 
dialogue, reform and democracy were significantly streamlined. Section 2 addressed “Governance, 
Transparency and Business Environment”, with no mention of the importance of democratic reform.90 
Instead, ‘governance’ was emphasised, with a particular focus on the stability of the economic and 
business environment. A commitment to “facilitate access of citizens to public services, particularly 
of women, youth and disabled citizens”, was one of the very few instances of actual commitment.91 
Absent from the 2015 Review, the deep and democracy concept was mentioned in the SSF, in spite of 
the absence of specific democracy promotion engagements. In short, this paper contends that even 
though a democracy promotion rhetoric can still be found in the SSF, few goals and instrument to 
reach them have actually been set out. The abundance and vagueness of the 2007 Action Plan’s 
democracy promotion provisions was reduced to a mere rhetorical commitment to achieve deep and 
sustainable democracy. Instead, the document setting out ENP objectives for Egypt in 2014-2016 was 
focused around the chronic instability of the regime and its negative consequences on the business 
environment in the country.  
 
Figure 3: Recurrent terms in the SSF. Created by the author. 
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5.2. The response of the EU to the 2013 military coup 
 
If a short-term perspective prevailed over long-term engagement in the formulation of EU-
Egypt partnership under the form of the SSF, it was not the only evidence of a cautious engagement 
from the EU. After the Islamists obtained an overwhelming majority of seats as a result of the first 
democratically-held elections in January 2012, with about 70% of the votes, the same year also saw 
the victory of their candidate Mohamed Morsi at the presidential election in June. Nevertheless, in 
light of the autocratic direction taken by the regime and its failure to improve socio-economic 
conditions, the democratically-elected Morsi government was deposed by a military coup in 2013, an 
evidence of the political turmoil faced by the country.92 The chance for EU foreign policy to operate 
with a government elected by strong popular will - however ideologically problematic its agenda may 
have been - was ruled over by the 3 July coup from Egyptian security forces. Hence the EU had to re-
define its vision of what relations with al-Sisi’s new government ought to be, with regard particularly 
to the drafting of a new Constitution. (Figure 4). The 2013 ENP Progress report, as well as a statement 
by High Representative Catherine Ashton before the European Parliament, offer an interesting 
combination of high threat perception and strong normative duty narrative. In spite of relatively strong 
condemnation of the behaviour of security forces in the ousting of Mohamed Morsi, as well as 
denunciation of the various human rights violations committed by the interim government led by 
General al-Sisi, the report did not refer to the situation as a coup, and failed to strongly condemn the 
decision of the military to take over the government.93 Though the coup represented a major violation 
of democratic principles, as well as an important set-back only one year after the first democratically-
held elections of the country, it was not met by strong political action from the Union.  
 
Insisting on the “real fear”, “genuine fear”, “growing level of violence”, “polarisation”, “alarming” 
situation, “terrible violence”, “growing worries”, and with a personal engagement, “I could feel the 
antipathy on the streets”, High Representative Ashton developed a very strong crisis rhetoric in her 
address to the European Parliament on 11 September 2013.94 She added a strong degree of emergency, 
stating that she “urged them to go forward toward the democratic future”, and that she “told 
[Mohamed Morsi] that [she] believed that he and his country were running out of time.” Along with 
this threat/risk narrative, the EEAS spokeswoman presented herself, the new diplomatic service she 
incarnated, and the EU as a whole as an indispensable mediator. She placed a very strong emphasis on 
the role of the EU as a broker in achieving dialogue, “inclusive progress” for a “more democratic and 
more prosperous Egypt.”95 This is an interesting example of a narrative of voluntarism from a key EU 
representative, in a context where the EU, in spite of an image of mediator relayed by official 
documents and the HR, did not exert sufficient diplomatic pressure to influence the course of events. 
“Brotherhood” was central to the democracy promotion section of the 2013 Progress report, 
“ousting”, “trials” or “dispersal” secondary. This revealed a specific discursive strategy of the EU, 
relaying an image of broker and important mediator in the political crisis faced by Egypt.  
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Figure 4: Recurrent terms in the 2013 Progress report. Created by the author. 
 
 
 
4.3. Exclusionary politics in the 2015 legislative elections 
 
The legislative elections held in 2015 revealed the lack of consistency in EU calls for dialogue and 
political inclusion. In March 2014, Presidential elections were announced by the interim regime, led 
by General al-Sisi, designated Field Marshal by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. The EU 
dispatched an Election Observation Mission (EOM), only to witness the large victory of the candidate 
of the military, with 97% of the votes. The Mission found the elections to be “satisfactory on polling 
day itself”, noting however the “challenging political context”, “partial media coverage” and a “very 
limited space for dissent.”96 Whereas the EU pointed to that absence of opposition, it was not however 
vocal about the lack of pluralism in the subsequent December 2015 legislative elections. Indeed, these 
elections evidenced the particularly exclusionary type of politics practiced by al-Sisi’s regime. 
Announced as a way to remedy to the absence of a chamber of representatives since the dissolution of 
the first freely and democratically-elected Parliament in 2012, the victory of the coalition “For the 
love of Egypt” did not hide its intention to reinforce the Presidency, to the detriment of the legislative 
assembly.97 With 75% abstention, the complete exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood, the boycott of 
its offspring ‘Strong Egypt’, of the liberal Destour Party and the centrist platform ‘Sahwet Mist’ 
(Egypt’s Awakening), the elections shattered popular hopes for political representativeness. Loyalists 
secured tight control over the assembly, excluding all competition from the Parliament, thus 
preventing the participation of important segments of the opposition as well as reinforcing a 
Presidency controlled by the military.98 The lack of action from the part of the EU in this context 
amounted to a silent endorsement of President al-Sisi’s regime’s demonisation of political opponents, 
only tainted by relative indignation after the death sentences pronounced against former President 
Morsi and a hundred more individuals.99 No statements were issued concerning the clear exclusionist 
political agenda pursued by the state authorities. The flexibility of EU democracy promotion agenda, 
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mirrored by its lack of action and leverage over the military regime, was apparent, and the prospects 
of an autocratic ruler in Cairo did not disrupt a heavily entrenched stabilising agenda. It also marked 
the end of a traditional neighbourhood policy instrument: present in words but not in acts, 
conditionality was undoubtedly missing in the EU response to such flagrant denial of democracy. In 
spite of this failure to trigger change through engagements with state authorities and refusal to ‘name 
and shame’ the two subsequent Egyptian regimes, the EU did however strengthen its emphasis on 
civil society assistance in ENP documents. 
 
Figure 5: Recurrent terms in the 2014 Progress report. Created by the author. 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
4.4. EU Civil society assistance in Egypt 
 
Although civil society support is not formally speaking a novelty, it has however received 
increasing attention since the 2011 uprisings. It has become a central aspect of ENP democracy 
promotion rhetoric, as a full section was dedicated to the ‘partnership with societies’ in the NRCN. 
Recent years saw a significant increase in the support to Egyptians CSOs in financial terms, rising to 
3.3 million per year on average in 2014, up from 1.9 million in 2010. The EU Delegation to Egypt 
also managed 56 grants destined to civil society support in 2014, which amounted to €26.7 million.100 
This assistance was not financed as part of the ENPI, hence bypassing formal agreement between the 
EU and partner countries. It was indeed channelled through specific instrument such as the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights or the recently created European Endowment for 
Democracy and Civil Society Facility. The Court of Auditors itself argued that the EEAS and 
Commission should narrow its democracy promotion goals, possibly with a transfer of funds from 
ENI to programs targeting civil society organisations.101 While the agenda of the EU in the region has 
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been increasingly informed by securitisation logics, focused around a stabilising agenda, growing 
efforts to promote a lively civil society did represent a step forward. 
 
However, substantial critics have been formulated as to the capacity of the EU to uphold this 
commitment when it is faced with adversity. For instance, the EU failed to give an adequate response 
in November 2012, when a number of human rights organisations did not get access to the first 
Egyptian-European Task Force following an arbitrary decision from the Egyptian Foreign Minister.102 
Additionally, a €5 billion aid package was proposed to the Egyptian authorities during the November 
2012 Task Force. Nonetheless, only €90 million, issued through the SPRING program, were made 
conditional to political reform, while around €500 million were made conditional to the acceptance of 
an IMF loan programme.103 This was an important evidence of the failure of the EU to capture the 
expectations of local civil society, as it failed to uphold its voluntarist rhetoric through conditionality, 
while retaining the economic approach that led to a worsening socio-economic environment in the 
first place. 
Furthermore, much has been said about a growing crack-down on civil society since the 2013 military 
coup: an open letter from 16 CSOs - including the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Euromed 
Rights, Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders - firmly condemned EU passivity in the 
light of these democracy abuses. It referred specifically to a new bill on civil associations, adopted by 
the Egyptian parliament and referred to the Presidency on 29 November 206, which in the words of 
UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association Maina Kiai 
would “devastate civil society not only in the short term, but possibly for generations to come.”104 
Notably though, two statements from the EEAS Spokesperson addressed this situation: on 24 March 
2016 and 17 September 2016, the EEAS formulated its concerns over the situation of civil society in 
Egypt, particularly with respect to “travel bans, asset freezes and the summoning of human rights 
defenders.”105 Both statements called on the “Egyptians authorities to allow the independent 
functioning of civil society organisations and human rights defenders.”106 
 
Political turmoil in Egypt prompted the EU to adopt an increasingly salient threat narrative. It was 
also associated with a significant downscaling of democracy promotion commitments in official ENP 
documents. This may corroborate Daniela Huber’s theoretical framework, as a higher threat 
perception from the part of the EU weakened its democracy promotion rhetoric. Alongside these 
developments, a lack of consistency in the discursive configurations of EU democracy promotion has 
been observed: after relaying an image of indispensable mediator in the stalled 2013 political 
situation, it did not attempt to seriously challenge President al-Sisi’s demonisation of the opposition. 
As it failed to strongly condemn the 2013 military coup, it endorsed the brutality of the new military 
regime. Moreover, the non-pluralist 2015 legislative elections were a particular evidence of the 
flexibility of EU engagement, as well as the stabilising agenda of its external action. Indeed, the 
meagre criticism formulated against al-Sisi’s crackdown on dissent, revealed a weak commitment to 
promote democratic pluralism in the context of the 2015 legislative elections. With regard to civil 
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society assistance, in spite of a lack of action to substantiate its rhetorical engagements, the EU did 
issue a limited number of statements voicing its concerns over the crack down on CSOs under 
President al-Sisi. Such inconsistency from the Union to uphold its voluntarist rhetoric can participate 
in explaining both the lack of influence the EU exerted on its partner countries and the scepticism felt 
by CSOs in the Southern neighbourhood.  
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Chapter Six: Case Study 2 - Tunisia 
 
 
 
The second case study selected for this thesis is Tunisia. Its transitional process has globally 
been hailed as an example for the region, which resulted in EU support to be considerably upgraded 
since the 2011 uprising. The following section was built over thorough scrutiny of ENP documents 
since 2011.107 The analysis of EU-Tunisia Action Plans, Progress reports, Cooperation report and 
statements from the High Representative reveals very different discursive configurations from those 
observed in the documents related to Egypt. The privileged nature of EU-Tunisia relationship was 
particularly emphasised in the texts analysed. Moreover, the relative successes met by Tunisia in its 
transitional process were the primary focus of ENP rhetoric in the five-year period following the 
ousting of Ben Ali’s regime. In contrast with the Egyptian case, every steps toward a more democratic 
governance received praises from the EU. Finally, the EU put a significant accent on the role of 
inclusive dialogue - with civil society as well as political opposition - in a successful democratic 
transition. 
 
Figure 6: Recurrent words in the 2011 Progress report. Figure created by the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                      
107 Some of the documents were only available in French, as it remains the primary language of communication 
with the Tunisian authorities: when necessary, translation was carried out by the author.  
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6.1. EU-Tunisia: A privileged partnership 
High Representative Federica Mogherini emphasised the “privileged character” of EU-
Tunisia partnership.108 This was concretised through the establishment of a privileged partnership in 
2012, a special status only Tunisia benefited from. A strong emphasis was thus put on Tunisia as a 
role model for the MENA. A financial assistance of €300 million was decided for 2017, whereas 
support to Egypt through the SSF 2014-2016 amounted to ca. €320 million for the whole period. In 
financial terms, Tunisia received considerably more support than Egypt in recent years. As a whole, 
the EU considerably stepped up its support to Tunisia since 2011: it received around €1.2 billion in 
grants, €800 million in Micro-Financial Assistance as well as a number of loans from the European 
Investment Bank, which added up to €3.5 billion over a five-year period since the uprising. Among 
those grants, around €890 million were provided under the ENP.109 A more vocal insistence on 
conditionality can be noted: the conclusions of the Council from 1 June 2016, announcing a €500 
million loan in cooperation with the IMF, was characterised by the signature of a Memorandum of 
Understanding, a formal agreement over economic and financial objectives to be monitored.110 It 
revealed the economic and financial approach, in line with the expectations of the IMF, central to EU 
support. As shown by Figure 7 below, EU grants overwhelmingly targeted the economic sector: 
slightly over €510 million, out of €800 million supplied over the 2011-2015 period, were dedicated to 
the improvement of the Tunisian economy, against €96 million provided for good governance and 
democracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                      
108 European External Action Service, (2016). Remarques de la Haute Représentante Mogherini à l'issue de la 
rencontre avec le Président de la Tunisie, Essebsi. [online]. Brussels: 1 December 2016. 
109 European External Action Service, (2016). EU support for transition in Tunisia. [online]. Brussels: 16 
September 2016. 
110 European Council and Council of the European Union, (2016). Tunisia: Council agrees to €500m in loans. 
[online]. Brussels: 1 June 2016. 
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Figure 7: Bilateral cooperation EU-Tunisia 2011-2015 (in millions €).111 
 
 
Unlike Egypt, cooperation with Tunisia was envisioned in more of a long-term perspective: to the 
two-year Single Support Framework negotiated with the Egyptian authorities, can be opposed the 
2013-2017 Action Plan designed to preside over EU-Tunisia relations. A comprehensive, 50 pages 
long document set out the general principles and more specific objectives of this cooperation. It can 
be noted that the document contains a 9 pages ‘Political cooperation section’, and a 25 pages 
‘Economic and Social Cooperation’ section.112 Whereas the documents related to Egypt laid down a 
                                                                                                      
111 Délégation de l'Union européenne en Tunisie, (2016). Rapport 2015: Coopération de l'Union européenne en 
Tunisie. Tunis: Délégation de l'Union européenne en Tunisie, p.20. 
112 European Commission, (2016). Plan d'Action UE-Tunisie 2013-2017. Brussels. 
    
36  
short-term stabilising agenda, the EU-Tunisia Action Plan consisted in an exhaustive program 
informed by a clear, long-term perspective, in line with the prospect of a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area. Its introduction insisted on the conditionality of EU support, and compared with the 
rhetoric developed with Egypt, the discursive configurations of democracy promotion in this Action 
Plan did point to the use of this instrument. Indeed, it praised the Tunisian Revolution, “carrying 
hopes of a better life for Tunisians citizens”, congratulated its successes, “a new page of its modern 
history” laying down the “bases for the development of a true democracy”, and generally developed a 
highly optimistic and voluntarist narrative.113 Interestingly, this narrative of success was built on the 
idea that Tunisia had endorsed “values, henceforth shared with the European Union”, the primary 
motive for the establishment of a privileged partnership. As a whole, the Action Plan emphasised the 
fact that renewed cooperation was a reward for the progress accomplished by Tunisia. 
Figure 8: Recurrent words in the 2012 Progress report. Figure created by the author. 
 
6.2. Tunisia: A role model for EU neighbourhood 
In high contrast with the cautious rhetoric - or silence - shown by the EU during Egyptian 
presidential and legislative elections, Federica Mogherini made sure to present her congratulations 
immediately after Mr Beji Caid Essebsi was elected to the Presidency on 22 December 2014.114 The 
Statement saw the election as a “milestone” in the transitional process and a “message of hope” for 
other countries in the region. Moreover, three specific axis guided the EU’s cooperation with Tunisia: 
“consolidation of democracy”, the improvement of socio-economic opportunities for the youth and 
support in the fight against terrorism.115 The fact that Tunisia laid down the bases for a Western-styled 
democracy prompted the EU to seize the opportunity to emphasise progress in its Southern 
                                                                                                      
113 Ibid., p.3. 
114 European External Action Service, (2014). Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica 
Mogherini on the presidential elections in Tunisia. [online]. Brussels: 22 December 2014. 
115 European Commission, (2016). Relations Between the EU and Tunisia: EU Support for Transition in 
Tunisia. [online] Brussels: 15 September 2016. 
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neighbourhood. Indeed, the language used ENP documents related to Tunisia was considerably more 
optimistic and filled with a narrative of voluntarism. In spite of a number of terrorist attacks - 
shootings in the Bardo National Museum on 18 March 2015 and near Sousse on 26 June 2015, and a 
suicide bombing in Tunis later that year - and difficulties in the security sector resulting from the 
neighbouring Libyan civil war, EU rhetoric remained decidedly supportive.  
The democracy promotion agenda of the new Action Plan appeared resolutely specific, listing three 
main areas of reform, and nine more specific issues to address, such as cooperation with the Council 
of Europe, consolidation of the rule of law, establishment of an independent electoral Commission 
and justice sector reform. Though it did not present striking differences with Tunisia’s 2007 Action 
Plan, it did widely differ from the engagements endorsed with Egypt, vague and numerous as showed 
by the previous section. It thus gave the image of a focused sectoral cooperation, prompted by a 
general satisfaction over the political situation in Tunisia. Additionally, the recurrent themes in the 
democracy promotion sections of Progress Reports remained sensibly the same, as demonstrated by 
the figures presented in this section. Unlike Egypt, the Tunisian context did not prompt the EU toward 
a considerable revision of its democracy promotion agenda; rather it developed a language of 
consolidation, based on a perspective informed by the deep democracy approach. Through the 
negotiation of a privileged partnership with Tunisia, and the development of a narrative of 
voluntarism, the EU seized the opportunity to reaffirm its hopes for the neighbourhood.  
Indeed, Tunisia, as the biggest recipient of EU aid and the sole example of successful democratic 
transition - exempt of a major setback such as the 2013 military coup in Egypt - has been praised by 
ENP documents and hailed as a model for the region. This answers to two dynamics: on the one hand 
Tunisia did achieve a relatively open and pluralist democratic system of governance, which did 
represent a remarkable success in the EU vicinity. This prompted the EU toward increased 
cooperation and deeper integration of the Tunisian economy in its internal market. This found a 
particular echo in the 2014 Progress report, which pointed to a “voluntarist democratic dynamic”, 
characterised by the adoption of the Constitution on 26 January 2014, the endorsement of a new 
electoral law and “free, transparent and inclusive” presidential and legislative elections in 2014.116 On 
the other hand, it brought about a certain confirmation that political change in the Southern 
neighbourhood was indeed possible. Even though most commentators agreed that the EU played very 
little part in that, Tunisia had been EU’s closest partner in the MENA, politically, socially and 
economically, which represented an opportunity for the Union to step up its support, as a 
demonstration of its commitment to assist political reform in its neighbourhood. The Tunisian model 
was the closest thing to a Western-styled liberal economy in the region, and as the EU hailed its 
successes, it prompted other partners to follow to same path, which allowed it to somehow stage the 
Tunisian Revolution as the model to follow. Strong emphasis on the economic and financial aspects 
of the partnership, echoed by the fact that they remained the primary recipient sectors for EU aid, as 
well as on the participation of Tunisian civil society to the success of the transition, became the 
hallmarks of a new approach in EU neighbourhood policy.  
 
 
                                                                                                      
116 Commission Européenne et Haute Représentante de l'Union Européenne pour les Affaires Étrangères et la 
Politique de Sécurité, (2015). Mise en oeuvre de la politique européenne de voisinage en Tunisie: Progrès 
réalisés en 2014 et actions à mettre en oeuvre. Bruxelles: SWD(2015) 73 final, p.3. 
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Figure 9: Recurrent words in the 2013 Progress report. Figure created by the author. 
 
6.3. Civil society in Tunisia: Inclusive dialogue and transitional process 
A September 2016 Joint Communication considered that the people of Tunisia had “paved the 
way for a modern democracy” and qualified Tunisian civil society as “vibrant.”117 An emphasis has 
often been placed on the potential of civil society in consolidating transitional processes. This trend 
found its greatest echo in the participation of CSOs to the High Council for the Realisation of the 
Goals of the Revolution, Political Reforms and Democratic Transition, which brought together 
representatives of the civil society, political parties or trade unions from the 5 April 2011 in order to 
prepare the elections. The early withdrawal of the Islamic party Ennahda from the High Council did 
however reveal a certain polarisation of the Tunisian society. The ‘exemplarity’ of the Tunisian model 
with regard to political inclusiveness was also tainted by the assassination of two major figures of the 
secularist opposition in 2013, Chokri Belaid on 6 February and Mohamed Brahmi 25 July, by hard-
line Salafists. These killings questioned the possibility for the leftist opposition to operate safely and 
revealed the profound divisions inherent in Tunisian society, growing primarily “along the religious-
secularist vector.”118 Nevertheless, the political crisis that followed the assassinations was answered to 
through the mediation of the National Dialogue Quartet, an example of political dialogue according to 
the EU. The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet henceforth played a significant role in consolidating 
the political transition. The mediation role between Ennahda and opposition parties endorsed by the 
Tunisian General Labour Union, the Tunisian Confederation of Industry Trade and Handicrafts, the 
Tunisian Human Rights League and Tunisian Order of Lawyers earned them the 2015 Nobel Prize for 
Peace and widespread support from world leaders, including Angela Merkel, Barack Obama and Ban 
                                                                                                      
117 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
(2016). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Strengthening EU support for 
Tunisia. Brussels: JOIN(2016) 47 final, p.3.  
118 Behr, T. and Siitonen, A. (2007). Working Paper - Building Bridges or Digging Trenches? Civil Society 
Engagement after the Arab Spring. [online] The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, p.10. 
    
39  
Ki-moon. High Representative Federica Mogherini notably qualified them as the “architects of a 
unique transition” and a “model for crisis resolution in the region.”119 The statement issued after the 
National Dialogue Quartet received the Nobel Peace Prize saw in the inclusive Tunisian political 
dialogue THE answer to the turmoil faced by the region. It identified civil society participation as the 
most important answer to political instability, in a discursive configuration that favoured the recently 
upgraded ENP commitment to civil society assistance. 
Nevertheless, during negotiations for Tunisia’s advanced status in 2010, the EU ignored the demands 
of human rights activists who wished to postpone the dialogue because of political repression. These 
demands were answered to by the Tunisian regime by a constitutional amendment which made it a 
criminal activity to “incite foreign parties not to grant loans to Tunisia, not to invest in the country, to 
boycott tourism or to sabotage Tunisia’s efforts to obtain advanced-partner status with the EU.”120 The 
absence of a reaction from the EU to such blatant abuse of freedom of expression and democratic 
pluralism revealed failure and inconsistency in the implementation of conditionality in its democracy 
promotion agenda. Moreover, Giselle Bosse argued that ENP Action Plans had been negotiated in a 
fully intergovernmental setting, with a rare involvement of civil society organisations and the clear 
dominance of a short-term, stability perspective over concerns over calls for “long-term political 
reforms.”121 In spite of the declared commitment of the EU to further engage with civil society actors 
in the Arab world in the aftermath of the uprisings, it has failed to trigger such dialogue in the context 
of the EU-Tunisian negotiations on the Privileged Partnership, to which local CSOs and the National 
Constituent Assembly did not participate.122  
Hailing the role of Tunisian civil society in the transitional process was thus accompanied with 
striking inconsistencies, such as a “closed doors” approach to these important negotiations over the 
future of EU-Tunisia partnership. One reason for this may be the primacy of an economic and 
financial vision of cooperation, according to which transition in Tunisia should be accompanied with 
deeper integration of its economic in the EU internal market. Silencing civil society in that context 
may amount to the consolidation of this approach, in line with IMF policy. An approach that some 
have described as potentially problematic for Tunisian agricultural production, which would face 
higher competition if it were to be fully integrated with the conclusion of a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area. Paciello evoked criticism over the dangers of “deepening economic relations with 
the EU in the context of the current crisis.”123 
 
 
                                                                                                      
119 European External Action Service, (2015). Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica 
Mogherini on the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Tunisia's National Dialogue Quartet. [online]. Brussels: 9 
October 2015. 
120 Huber, D. (2015). Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy: Identity and Interests in US, EU and Non-
Western Democracies. London: Palgrave Macmillan, p.52. 
121 Bosse, G. (2007). Values in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy: Political Rhetoric or Reflection of a Coherent 
Policy?. European Political Economy Review, [online] 7, p.58. 
122 Paciello, M. (2013). The Euro Crisis and Euro-Mediterranean Relations. Euro-Mediterranean Relations 
Facing New Challenges. [online] Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome University of Rome La 
Sapienza, p.87. 
123 Paciello, M. (2013). The Euro Crisis and Euro-Mediterranean Relations. Euro-Mediterranean Relations 
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Figure 10: Recurrent words in the 2014 Progress report. Figure created by the author. 
 
The Tunisian people ousted President Ben Ali’s authoritarian rule in January 2011, and the actors of 
the Revolution subsequently managed to achieve the only relatively peaceful political transition in the 
region. As the process of democratisation did not seem to suffer major setbacks such as in Egypt, the 
EU remained decidedly supportive and considerably stepped up its support to the transition. Hailed as 
a model of political inclusiveness and dialogue, Tunisia did however experience a deepening cleavage 
along the lines of a Secularist-Islamist divide. Nevertheless, its partnership with the EU was 
considerable upgraded since 2011, and Tunisia now benefits from the closest framework for 
cooperation in North Africa. This revealed a consistent implementation of positive conditionality, 
with this cooperation being depicted as a reward for the success met by Tunisia in attaining the 
objectives of its Action Plan. ENP documents built on the Tunisian example to step-up support to the 
country. EU authorities developed a very optimistic, voluntarist narrative that led to the signature of a 
Privileged Partnership and negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. This section 
concludes that economic integration remains the ultimate objective for EU external action in the 
MENA, and that democracy promotion policies are shaped as an instrument to guarantee stable 
institutions in partner countries. The example of Tunisia, which achieved a relatively peaceful and 
inclusive democratic transition, demonstrates that in such context, the EU can be prompt to apply 
positive conditionality and deepen its cooperation with its neighbours.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions. ‘Neighbourhood’ Policy or traditional foreign policy? 
 
 
 
The elected methodological framework for this thesis was inscribed in the three-dimensional 
framework developed by Norman Fairclough in his Critical Discourse Analysis. This perspective 
sees, in each instance of discourse, a text, a discursive practice and a social practice. This analysis is 
concluded following this approach. 
 
Thorough scrutiny of revised ENP documents shows an increasing crisis rhetoric centred around an 
assessment of instability at EU borders. This prompted the EU to adopt a comprehensive stabilising 
agenda, associated with a significant downgrading of its democracy promotion provisions. The 
Egyptian case seems to confirm the idea that higher threat perception hinders the exercise of 
democracy promotion abroad. Indeed, political turmoil in Egypt propelled the EU to adopt a more 
cautious rhetoric, characterised by a considerably more fragile narrative of normative duty and 
voluntarism, and tainted with inconsistencies in the denunciation of anti-democratic developments, 
particularly with regard to the 2013 military coup or the non-pluralist 2015 legislative elections.  
 
On the other hand, official ENP documents celebrate progress accomplished by Tunisia, hailed as a 
role model for the MENA region. They demonstrate a more focused democracy promotion agenda, 
and generally step up support to the transition in Tunisia. They insist particularly on the role of civil 
society and inclusive dialogue in the success of the transitional process. This remains an isolated 
element of inclusive and participatory politics in the MENA, which may however push the EU toward 
more decisiveness and consistency in its civil society assistance policies. While recognising the limits 
of this endeavour, in the light of the current crack-down on civil society orchestrated by President al-
Sisi’s regime, this paper does acknowledge that a new narrative of inclusiveness, centred around 
greater support to CSOs in the region, is emerging in ENP democracy promotion rhetoric. Although 
some inconsistencies have been emphasised, EU Spokespersons, including High Representative 
Federica Mogherini, have been relatively vocal as to the important for local civil society to operate in 
a safe and inclusive environment. Moreover, a number of instruments have been created as an answer 
to the changes in the region, and it remains to be seen whether Civil Society Facility and European 
Endowment for Democracy can take up an innovative role in this context. This new narrative of civil 
society assistance may represent an added-value to the ENP democracy promotion agenda. Further 
research on this topic could complement the findings of this study. 
 
Tunisia had been the EU’s first partner in the region, notably by being the first neighbour to sign an 
Association Agreement in 1995. In this context, to celebrate Tunisia, its openness, democracy and 
pluralism also implies to celebrate its closeness with the Union and claim the fulfilment of EU hopes 
for its Southern Neighbourhood. As such, the formulation of ENP discourse after the Arab uprisings 
constitutes as much an assessment of changes in the neighbourhood as the projection by the EU of a 
particular perspective on these events. The depiction of the Southern Mediterranean as a particular 
arena for the exercise of EU democracy promotion, point to a region in need of assistance and 
guidance. This narrative of duty, particularly obvious with Catherine Ashton’s emphasis on the EU as 
an indispensable mediator in the political crisis faced by Egypt in 2013, allows the EU to discursively 
construct itself as a normative actor. Through the discursive configurations of ENP, which present the 
Union as a necessary broker in the political turmoil of the region, the EU shapes and constructs power 
relations with the Southern Mediterranean. To step-up support to Tunisia also allows the EU to depict 
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itself as an essential support in the Tunisian transition, another instance of ENP discourse relaying a 
normative image for the EU.  
 
The general direction taken by the partnership with Egypt and Tunisia confirms the impression 
formulated in Chapter Four that the ENP democracy promotion agenda is informed by a causal 
mechanism that establishes democratic governance as a prerequisite for socio-economic development. 
Nevertheless, the 2011 uprisings in Egypt in Tunisia have shown that it is precisely demands for the 
latter that precipitated both countries toward social upheaval and eventually political transition. This 
paper eventually contends that promotion of democratic governance in EU vicinity derives from a 
concern for stability, as democracy promotion is identified by the Union as the most stable and secure 
environment for business. Involvement with neighbouring countries is in that sense more of a strategic 
necessity than a normative ambition. The case of Egypt is particularly revelatory: after an initially 
supportive rhetoric, political instability in the country prompted the EU to refocus its ENP discourse 
on economic stabilisation and the return to a stable business environment. The passivity of the Union 
with regard to the authoritarian turn taken by Egypt quickly after the revolution revealed the 
discrepancies of its democracy promotion discourse. On the other hand, the relative successes met by 
Tunisia stimulated the signature of a Privileged Partnership in 2012, as well as the opening of 
negotiations around a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, the highest level of cooperation 
available to a neighbour with no membership perspective. Greater access to the internal market is in 
that respect conditional to the instauration of relatively stable democratic institutions. This suggests 
that the democracy promotion agenda of the Union is shaped as an instrument to guarantee a certain 
stability in neighbouring states, itself necessary in order to conduct comprehensive economic 
cooperation. In that sense it does not appear to be a normative objective in itself, but rather a 
necessary step toward further economic integration.  
 
In his address to the Second Southern Neighbourhood Civil Society Forum held on 28-29 May 2015, 
President of the European Economic and Social Committee Henri Malosse insisted on the importance 
of a “reinforcement of actions of decentralised cooperation” across the Mediterranean.124 This 
statement echoes the new approach for the ENP formulated in particular in the 2015 Review. Under 
the headlines of ownership, flexibility and differentiation, the 2015 document marks a certain rupture 
with the perspective endorsed up to that point. Indeed, it puts an end to the uniformity of the 
neighbourhood framework. It establishes a system of partnerships with various speeds, different 
objectives and benchmarks, as well as a greater margin of manoeuvre for neighbouring states. Henri 
Malosse went on to argue that the term ‘neighbourhood policy’ should be reviewed, to which High 
Representative Federica Mogherini answered was a discernible nod. The term ‘neighbourhood’ gives 
an impression of EU-centrism: it depicts the Union as the central actor in the region, faced with the 
duty -or necessity- to engage with its neighbours. The shift from a narrative of normative duty and a 
very voluntarist tone to a narrative of risk, discussed in previous sections, echoes a fundamental 
change in the way the EU perceives its own role in the region. From a willingness to engage with 
potential partners, the ENP evolved toward a necessity to deal with neighbouring threats.  
 
  
  
 
                                                                                                      
124 European External Action Service, (2015). Federica Mogherini at the 2nd Southern Neighbourhood Civil 
Society Forum. [video]. 
    
43  
References 
 
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
2nd ed. London: Verso. 
Ashton, C. (2011). The EU wants 'deep democracy' to take root in Egypt and Tunisia. The Guardian. 
[online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/feb/04/egypt-tunisia-
eu-deep-democracy [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
'Asilah, S., Qamha, A. and Soltan, G. (2011). The Arab Barometer Project: Arab Republic of Egypt. 
[online] Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. Available at: 
http://www.arabbarometer.org/country/egypt [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Behr, T. (2012). The European Union's Mediterranean policies after the Arab spring: Can the Leopard 
change its spots?. Amsterdam Law Forum, [online] 4(2), pp.76-88. Available at: 
http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/download/268/454 [Accessed 26 Jul. 2016]. 
Behr, T. and Siitonen, A. (2007). Working Paper - Building Bridges or Digging Trenches? Civil 
Society Engagement after the Arab Spring. [online] The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 
Available at: http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/308/building_bridges_or_digging_trenches/ 
[Accessed 15 Jul. 2016]. 
Bosse, G. (2007). Values in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy: Political Rhetoric or Reflection of a 
Coherent Policy?. European Political Economy Review, [online] 7, pp.38-62. Available at: 
http://eper.htw-berlin.de/no7/bosse.pdf [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Bossuyt, F., Orbie, J. and Wetzel, A. (2015). One of what kind? Comparative perspectives on the 
substance of EU democracy promotion. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 28(1), 
pp.21-34. Available at: 
https://www.academia.edu/11942261/One_of_what_kind_Comparative_Perspectives_on_the_Su
bstance_of_EU_Democracy_Promotion [Accessed 17 March 2017]. 
Buzan, B., Waever, O. and de Wilde, J. (1997). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 1st ed. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Campbell, D. (1992). Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. 1st 
ed. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Cardwell, P. (2010). EuroMed, European neighbourhood policy and the union for the Mediterranean: 
Overlapping policy frames in the EU's governance of the Mediterranean*. JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 49(2), pp.219-241. Available at: 
https://www.academia.edu/6601516/EuroMed_European_Neighbourhood_Policy_and_the_Unio
n_for_the_Mediterranean_Overlapping_Policy_Frames_in_the_EUs_Governance_of_the_Medit
erranean [Accessed 17 March 2017]. 
    
44  
Christou, G. (2010). European Union security logics to the east: the European Neighbourhood Policy 
and the Eastern Partnership. European Security, [online] 19(3), pp.413-430. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09662839.2010.526110 [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Commission Européenne et Haute Représentante de l'Union Européenne pour les Affaires Etrangères 
et la Politique de Sécurité, (2015). Mise en oeuvre de la politique européenne de voisinage en 
Tunisie: Progrès réalisés en 2014 et actions à mettre en oeuvre. Bruxelles: SWD(2015) 73 final. 
Commission of the European Communities, (2003). Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New 
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. Brussels: COM(2003) 104 
final. 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008]. 
Del Sarto, R. (2015). Normative empire Europe: The European Union, its borderlands, and the 'Arab 
spring'. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 54(2), pp.215-232. Available at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jcms.12282/full [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Délégation de l'Union européenne en Tunisie, (2016). Rapport 2015: Coopération de l'Union 
européenne en Tunisie. Tunis: Délégation de l'Union européenne en Tunisie. 
Echagüe, A., Michou, H. and Mikail, B. (2011). Europe and the Arab Uprisings: EU Vision versus 
Member State Action. Mediterranean Politics, [online] 16(2), pp.329-335. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2011.583760 [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
(2011). A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A review of European Neighbourhood 
Policy. Brussels: COM(2011) 303. 
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
(2011). Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. 
Brussels: COM(2011) 200 final. 
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
(2014). Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Egypt. Progress in 2013 and 
recommendations for action. Brussels: SWD(2014) 71 final. 
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
(2015). Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): stronger partnerships for a 
stronger neighbourhood. Brussels, 18 November 2015. Press release. 
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
(2015). Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Egypt. Progress in 2014 and 
recommendations for actions. Brussels: SWD(2015) 65 final. 
    
45  
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
(2015). Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels: JOIN(2015) 50 final. 
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
(2016). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Strengthening EU 
support for Tunisia. Brussels: JOIN(2016) 47 final. 
European Commission, (2012). Rapport de Diagnostic sur la Société Civile Tunisienne. Brussels. 
European Commission, (2013). EU’s response to the Arab Spring: the state-of-play after two years. 
Brussels: MEMO/13/81. 
European Commission, (2015). Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) - 
2014-2020: Single Support Framework for EU support to Egypt (2014-2016). Brussels: C(2015) 
9121 final. 
European Commission, (2016). Plan d'Action UE-Tunisie 2013-2017. Brussels. 
European Commission, (2016). Relations Between the EU and Tunisia: EU Support for Transition in 
Tunisia. [online] Brussels: 15 September 2016. Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/10_tunisia_4pg.pdf [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
European Council and Council of the European Union, (2016). Tunisia: Council agrees to €500m in 
loans. [online] Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/01-
tunisia-loans/ [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
European Court of Auditors, (2013). EU Cooperation with Egypt in the Field of Governance. Special 
Report. Brussels: April 2013. 
European External Action Service, (2003). A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy. [online] Brussels. Available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf [Accessed 8 Feb. 2017]. 
European External Action Service, (2013). Catherine Ashton - Statement on Egypt, European 
Parliament, 11 September 2013. [video] Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wAf0Q2allZU [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
European External Action Service, (2014). Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica 
Mogherini on the presidential elections in Tunisia. [online] Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2242/statement-high-
representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-presidential-elections-tunisia_en [Accessed 16 
Mar. 2017]. 
European External Action Service, (2015). Federica Mogherini at the 2nd Southern Neighbourhood 
Civil Society Forum. [video] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7TLsgc2FqsY 
[Accessed 17 Mar. 2017]. 
    
46  
European External Action Service, (2015). Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica 
Mogherini on the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Tunisia's National Dialogue Quartet. 
[online] Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/3131/statement-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-award-nobel-
peace-prize-tunisias_en [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
European External Action Service, (2016). EU support for transition in Tunisia. [online] Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/9893/eu-support-transition-
tunisia_en [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
European External Action Service, (2016). Remarques de la Haute Représentante Mogherini à l'issue 
de la rencontre avec le Président de la Tunisie, Essebsi. [online] Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/16254/remarques-de-la-haute-
representante-mogherini-lissue-de-la-rencontre-avec-le-president-de-la_en [Accessed 16 Mar. 
2017]. 
European External Action Service, (2016). Statement by the spokesperson on civil society in Egypt. 
[online] Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/2949/statement-spokesperson-civil-society-egypt_en [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
European External Action Service, (2016). Statement on the decision of an Egyptian Court to freeze 
the assets of Human rights defenders. [online] Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/9989/statement-decision-egyptian-
court-freeze-assets-human-rights-defenders_en [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and Social Change. 1st ed. Cambridge: Polity press. 
Foucault, M. (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge. 1st ed. New-York: Pantheon Books. 
Foucault, M. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. 1st ed. 
New-York: Pantheon Books. 
Freeassembly.net, (2016). Egypt NGO Bill Threatens To “Devastate” Civil Society, UN Expert 
Warns. [online] Available at: http://freeassembly.net/news/egypt-ngo-bill-november/ [Accessed 
16 Mar. 2017]. 
Freyburg, T., Lavenex, S., Schimmelfennig, F., Skripka, T. and Wetzel, A. (2011). Democracy 
Promotion Through Functional Cooperation? The Case of the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
Democratization, 18(4), pp.1026-1054. Available at: 
https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/european-politics-
dam/documents/People/Publications/Democracy_Promotion/Functional_Democracy_Freyburg.p
df [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. 1st ed. New-York: International 
Publishers. 
    
47  
Hahn, J. (2016). Stronger Neighbourhood, Stronger Partnerships: A Revised European 
Neighbourhood Policy. European Foreign Affairs Review, [online] 21(1), pp.1-4. Available at: 
https://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?id=EERR2016001 [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, (2015). Statement of the 
High Representative/Vice president Federica Mogherini on the Court decision against former 
President Morsi and more than a hundred individuals in Egypt. [online] Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/3364/statement-high-
representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-court-decision-against-former_en [Accessed 16 
Mar. 2017]. 
Hill, C. (2002). The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Huber, D. (2013). US and EU Human Rights and Democracy Promotion since the Arab Spring. 
Rethinking its Content, Targets and Instruments. The International Spectator, [online] 48(3), 
pp.98-112. Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03932729.2013.787827 
[Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Huber, D. (2015). Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy:  Identity and Interests in US, EU and 
Non-Western Democracies. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hyde-Price, A. (2006). ‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique. Journal of European Public 
Policy, [online] 13(2), pp.217-234. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501760500451634 [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Hyde-Price, A. (2008). A ‘tragic actor’? A realist perspective on ‘ethical power Europe’. International 
Affairs, [online] 84(1), pp.29-44. Available at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00687.x/abstract [Accessed 16 
Mar. 2017]. 
Jorgensen, M. and Phillips, L. (2002). Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. 1st ed. London: 
SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Juncos, A. and Whitman, R. (2012). The Arab spring, the Eurozone crisis and the neighbourhood: A 
region in flux. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 50, pp.147-161. 
Khalifa Isaac, S. (2013). Rethinking the new ENP: A vision for an enhanced European role in the 
Arab revolutions. Democracy and Security, 9(1-2), pp.40-60. 
Koenig, N. (2011). The EU and the Libyan crisis – in quest of coherence?. The International 
Spectator, [online] 46(4), pp.11-30. Available at: 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1119.pdf [Accessed 8 Feb. 2017]. 
Koenig, N. (2011). The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In Quest of Coherence?. The International 
Spectator, [online] 46(4), pp.11-30. Available at: 
    
48  
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03932729.2011.628089?journalCode=rspe20 
[Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Kurki, M. (2012). How the EU can adopt a new type of democracy support. [online] Madrid: 
Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE). Available at: 
http://fride.org/descarga/WP_112_democracy_support.pdf [Accessed 15 Mar. 2017]. 
Lawrence, J. (2013). The EU in Crisis: Crisis Discourse as a Technique of Government. Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 2013, [online] 44, pp.187-202. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287874666_The_EU_in_Crisis_Crisis_Discourse_as_a
_Technique_of_Government [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms?. JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 40(2), pp.235-258. Available at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/1468-5965.00353/asset/1468-
5965.00353.pdf?v=1&t=j0dvnxl4&s=5e022e38e908616106a25573884006b625c6288c 
[Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Mikail, B., Michou, H. and Echagüe, A. (2011). Europe and the Arab uprisings: EU vision versus 
member state action. Mediterranean Politics, 16(2), pp.329-335. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2011.583760 [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Monnet, J. (1978). Memoirs. 1st ed. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday. 
Mühlberger, W. (2015). Egypt's democratic window-dressing. Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs COMMENT 22. Helsinki: FIIA. 
Noble, C., Thompson, D. and Teti, A. (2013). EU democracy assistance discourse in its new response 
to a changing neighbourhood. Democracy and Security, [online] 9(1-2), pp.61-79. Available at: 
http://www.international-
alert.org/sites/default/files/Teti%20Thompson%20Noble%202013%20EU%20Democracy%20%
20Assistance%20Discourse%20in%20Its%20New%20Response%20to%20a%20Changing%20
Neighbourhood%20-%20v9n1%5B1%5D_0.pdf [Accessed 19 Jul. 2016]. 
Ottaway, M. (2016). Tunisia: The revolution is over, can reform continue?. [online] Available at: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/07/13/tunisia-revolution-is-over-can-reform-continue 
[Accessed 15 Jul. 2016]. 
Pace, M. (2002). The Ugly Duckling of Europe: The Mediterranean in the Foreign Policy of the 
European Union. Journal of European Area Studies, [online] 10(2), pp.189-210. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1460846022000040319 [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Pace, M. (2007). Norm shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a norm entrepreneur in the south?. 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, [online] 20(4), pp.659-675. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09557570701680704 [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
    
49  
Pace, M. (2009). Paradoxes and contradictions in EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean: The 
limits of EU normative power. Democratization, 16(1), pp.39-58. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510340802575809 [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Pace, M. (2010). Interrogating the European Union's Democracy Promotion Agenda: Discursive 
Configurations of 'Democracy' from the Middle East. European Foreign Affairs Review, [online] 
15(5), pp.611-628. Available at: 
http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?id=EERR2010044 [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Paciello, M. (2013). The Euro Crisis and Euro-Mediterranean Relations. [online] University of Rome 
La Sapienza: Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome. Available at: 
http://www.iemed.org/observatori/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/iemed-
2013/Paciello%20Euro%20Crisis%20Euromed%20Relations%20EN.pdf [Accessed 25 Jul. 
2016]. 
Paciello, M. (2013). The Euro Crisis and Euro-Mediterranean Relations. Euro-Mediterranean 
Relations Facing New Challenges. [online] Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome 
University of Rome La Sapienza. Available at: http://www.iemed.org/observatori/arees-
danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/iemed-
2013/Paciello%20Euro%20Crisis%20Euromed%20Relations%20EN.pdf [Accessed 16 Mar. 
2017]. 
Paoletti, E. (2014). The Arab spring and the Italian response to migration in 2011. Comparative 
Migration Studies, [online] 2(2), pp.127-150. Available at: https://www.imiscoe.org/journal-
cms-2/comparative-migration-studies-2014-2/65-2-paoletti-e-2014-the-arab-spring-and-the-
italian-response-to-migration-in-2011/file [Accessed 20 Jul. 2016]. 
Pinfari, M. (2013). The EU, Egypt and Morsi's Rise and Fall: ‘Strategic Patience’ and Its Discontents. 
Mediterranean Politics, [online] 18(3), pp.460-466. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2013.840441 [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Prakash, D. and Klotz, A. (2008). Qualitative methods in international relations: A pluralist guide. 
United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Robbins, M. (2016). Tunisia Five Years after the Revolution: Findings from the Arab Barometer. 
[online] Available at: http://www.arabbarometer.org/country/tunisia [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Schmidt, J. (2014). Constructing new environments versus attitude adjustment: Contrasting the 
substance of democracy in UN and EU democracy promotion discourses. Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 28(1), pp.35-54. 
Schumacher, T. (2011). The EU and the Arab spring: Between Spectatorship and Actorness. Insight 
Turkey, [online] 13(3), pp.107-119. Available at: 
http://media.library.ku.edu.tr/reserve/resfall12_13/intl447_BRumelili/9_nov_26_28.pdf 
[Accessed 8 Feb. 2017]. 
    
50  
Schumacher, T. (2015). Uncertainty at the EU's borders: narratives of EU external relations in the 
revised European Neighbourhood Policy towards the southern borderlands. European Security, 
[online] 24(3), pp.381-401. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09662839.2015.1028186?journalCode=feus20 
[Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Schumacher, T. (2016). Back to the Future: The ‘New’ ENP towards the Southern Neighbourhood 
and the End of Ambition. College of Europe Policy Brief. [online] Bruges: CEPOB. Available at: 
https://www.coleurope.eu/research-paper/back-future-new-enp-towards-southern-
neighbourhood-and-end-ambition [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Seeberg, P. and Shteiwi, M. (2014). European Narratives on the ‘Arab Spring’ – from Democracy to 
Security. [online] Odense: Center for ￼Mellemøststudier. Available at: 
https://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=
0ahUKEwjl5eb0i9nSAhXEPhQKHTWmAjMQFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sdu.dk
%2F-
%2Fmedia%2Ffiles%2Fom_sdu%2Fcentre%2Fc_mellemoest%2Fkonference%2F1404%2Bps%
2Band%2Bms.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHhTQkNSWQ5XPTrsmSCx6IhMD3EWA&sig2=wpOwcFG
vQi5uHIwEaXpHGg [Accessed 15 Mar. 2017]. 
Sjursen, H. (2011). The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: the quest for democracy. Journal 
of European Public Policy, [online] 18(8), pp.1069-1077. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2011.615192 [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Stetter, S. (2005). The politics of De-Paradoxification in Euro-Mediterranean relations: Semantics and 
structures of 'cultural dialogue'. Mediterranean Politics, 10(3), pp.331-348. 
Tonra, B. (2011). Democratic foundations of EU foreign policy: narratives and the myth of EU 
exceptionalism. Journal of European Public Policy, [online] 18(8), pp.1190-1207. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2011.615209 [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
UNDP, (2008). Egypt's Social Contract: The Role of Civil Society. Cairo: UNDP. 
United Nations Development Programme, (2008). Egypt's Social Contract: the Role of Civil Society. 
[online] Cairo. Available at: http://www.undp.org.eg/ [Accessed 15 Jul. 2016]. 
Virgili, T. (2014). The “Arab Spring” and the EU’s “Democracy Promotion” in Egypt: A Missed 
Appointment?. Perspectives on Federalism, [online] 6(3). Available at: http://www.on-
federalism.eu/attachments/193_download.pdf [Accessed 16 Mar. 2017]. 
Weaver, O. (1989). Security, The Speech Act. Analysing the Politics of a Word. 
Wolinsky-Nahmias, Y. and Sprinz, D. (2004). Models, numbers, and cases: Methods for studying 
international relations. 2nd ed. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press. 
    
51  
World Bank, (2016). Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016, 3rd Edition. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
 
